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Despite the prevalence of irregular wars, the U.S. Army must also be prepared for 
the possibility of a high-intensity conventional war. The training required for this war 
must simulate the expected conditions, those of high-intensity conflict, as closely as 
possible. As U.S. strategic leaders look to the future and prepare the U.S. Army for the 
next conflict, they prepare for a war with a level of violence that resembles that of the 
Korean War. While conditions that simulate combat are dangerous and present inherent 
risks, the mitigation of that risk prevents the adequate simulation of a high-intensity 
combat situation. Therefore, this thesis studied how risk mitigation practices in U.S. 
Army tactical infantry training affect Soldiers’ preparedness for high-intensity combat 
operations. By examining U.S. Army infantry training at the tactical level, U.S. Army 
safety and risk mitigation doctrine, cognitive and perceptual biases, and historical case 
studies, this thesis suggests that U.S. Army risk management practices neither hinder nor 
help combat preparedness. Instead, the abdication of a commander’s authority to execute 
risk mitigation in the training environment affects combat readiness. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. IS THE U.S. ARMY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT WAR? ............................1 
A. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................1 
B. THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................3 
D. EXISTING ARGUMENTS: THE DICHOTOMY OF RISK IN 
TRAINING .................................................................................................3 
II. TRAINING A U.S. ARMY INFANTRY COMPANY FOR COMBAT ...........9 
A. LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING TASK 
DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................................9 
1. The Role of the Company Commander .....................................10 
2. Company Organization and Information Flow ........................12 
3. Mission Essential Task List Development .................................13 
4. The Army Force Generation Model ...........................................15 
5. Training—Creating “Pre-Battle Veterans” ..............................16 
B. TECHNOLOGY—“THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF WAR”: 
BALANCING LETHALITY, MOBILITY, AND PROTECTION .....20 
1. Ground Delivery Platforms .........................................................21 
2. Optics and Night Vision...............................................................26 
3. Personal Protective Equipment ..................................................28 
C. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE TRAINING .......................................29 
1. Time and Task Saturation—“The Deluge of 
Requirements”..............................................................................29 
2. Peacetime Control Mechanisms / Range Regulations ..............31 
3. Organizational Complacency—“This Is the Way We’ve 
Always Done it” ............................................................................32 
4. Conclusion—The Effect of Training Obstacles .........................33 
III. RISK MITIGATION, MISSION COMMAND, AND ERODING 
COMBAT READINESS ......................................................................................35 
A. RISK AND SAFETY DOCTRINE .........................................................35 
1. Risk Management Doctrine ........................................................36 
2. Safety Doctrine and Regulation ..................................................38 
B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK PERCEPTION .................................39 
C. MISSION COMMAND AND RISK IN THE COMBAT 
ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................................44 
1. Training Misalignment with Mission Command ......................46 
 viii 
2. A Degradation in Readiness through the Lens of Live 
Fire Surface Danger Zones (SDZs) ............................................48 
3. Lack of Preparation— “Training Scar Tissue” ........................53 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................54 
IV. HISTORICAL CASES OF TACTICAL U.S. ARMY INFANTRY 
UNITS IN HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT ....................................................55 
A. 1-21 INFANTRY (TASK FORCE SMITH) AT THE START OF 
THE KOREAN WAR ..............................................................................56 
1. Leadership ....................................................................................57 
2. Training ........................................................................................59 
3. Technology ....................................................................................61 
4. Conclusion ....................................................................................62 
B. 1st BATTALION, 7th CAVALRY REGIMENT IN THE 
BATTLE OF IA DRANG ........................................................................63 
1. Leadership ....................................................................................65 
2. Technology ....................................................................................66 
3. Training ........................................................................................69 
4. Conclusion ....................................................................................71 
C. 75th RANGER REGIMENT DURING THE SEIZURE OF RIO 
HATO AIRFIELD ...................................................................................72 
1. Leadership ....................................................................................73 
2. Training ........................................................................................75 
3. Technology ....................................................................................79 
4. Conclusion ....................................................................................79 
D. CONCLUSION— LEADERSHIP IS THE LINCHPIN FOR 
COMBAT PREPARATION ...................................................................80 
V. CONCLUSION— THE OUTSOURCING OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
AUTHORITY UNDERMINES MISSION COMMAND .................................85 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO CURRENT 
PRACTICES AND U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE .......................................88 
1. U.S. Army Safety Doctrine Must Clarify the Role of 
Range Control ..............................................................................88 
2. U.S. Army Installations and Training Commands Should 
Streamline the Safety Waiver Process .......................................89 
3. Educate Leaders on the Effects of Cognitive and 
Perceptual Bias When Managing Risk ......................................89 
4. Senior Leaders Must Commit to Mission Command in 
the Training Environment ..........................................................90 
B. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED AND REQUIRING 
ADDITIONAL EXAMINATION ...........................................................90 
 ix 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................93 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. The Cycle of Risk Management in U.S. Army Doctrine ...........................37 
Figure 2. Risk Management Severity Categories Communicate Loss ......................40 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1SG First Sergeant 
2IC  Second in Command 
AAR  After Action Review 
AC Attack Cargo 
ACOG Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight 
ADRP Army Doctrine Reference Publication 
AH Attack Helicopter 
APC Armored Personnel Carrier 
ARFORGEN Army Force Generation 
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program 
ATP Army Technical Publication 
AUSA  Association of the United States Army 
BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
CAS Close Air Support 
COL Colonel 
CPT Captain 
FEC Far East Command 
FM  Field Manual 
GBU Guided Bomb Unit 
GFC Ground Force Commander 
HEAT High Explosive Antitank 
HMMWV High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 
HQ Head Quarters 
ICV Infantry Carrying Variant 
IED Improvised Explosive Devise 
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JTAC  Joint Tactical Air Controller 
KIA Killed in Action 
LFX Live Fire Exercise 
LMTV Light Medium Tactical Vehicle 
LTC Lieutenant Colonel 
 xiv 
LZ Landing Zone 
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 
MET  Mission Essential Task 
METL  Mission Essential Task List 
MGS Mobile Gun System 
MOUT Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 
MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
MSD  Minimum Safe Distance 
NCO Noncommissioned Officer  
NVA North Vietnamese Army 
OC Observer/Controller 
O/C/T Observer/Coach/Trainer 
OIC  Officer in Charge 
OPFOR Opposing Force 
P Practiced 
PDF Panamanian Defense Force 
PLF Parachute Landing Fall 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
PT Physical Training 
PZ  Pickup Zone 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
ROK Republic of Korea 
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 
RSO Range Safety Officer 
RWS Remote Weapon System 
SDZ  Surface Danger Zone 
T Trained 
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
U Untrained 
UH Utility Helicopter 
USABAAR United States Army Board for Aviation Accident Research 
WIA Wounded in Action 




As U.S. strategic leaders look to the future, their advice is to prepare for a war with 
“violence on the scale that the U.S. Army has not seen since Korea,” despite the prevalence 
of recent irregular wars.1 The training required for a major conventional war must simulate 
high-intensity conflict as closely as possible. While conditions that simulate combat are 
dangerous and present inherent risk to Soldiers’ personal safety, an aversion to this risk 
prevents the adequate simulation of a high-intensity combat situation. The concept of 
simulator fidelity suggests that increased realism in training results in increased combat 
readiness; however, current military training exercises deliberately decrease training 
fidelity in order to mitigate risk.2 After defining the friction between realistic training and 
safety, this thesis examined how risk mitigation in U.S. Army tactical Infantry training 
affects Soldiers’ preparedness for combat operations. A study of three distinct categories 
established the framework for answering this question. The first section details how 
Infantry companies train and the role of the commander. The second section studies both 
how risk is managed and how risk is perceived. The third section examines Infantry units in 
their “First Battles” to better understand how training effects combat performance.3 This 
thesis concludes by asserting that U.S. Army’s risk mitigation doctrine is both sound and 
effective, but its employment is inconsistent and environment specific. More specifically, 
the problem is that this doctrine is not implemented in concert with the U.S. Army’s 
philosophy of mission command.  
First, the training of U.S Army Infantry companies demands an understanding of 
their Mission Essential Task List (METL), and the role of the company commander in 
establishing a unit training plan (UTP) that achieves his vision. This training plan must 
account for the company and higher mission, and then balance the mobility, lethality, and 
                                                 
1 William C. Hix, “General Bernard W. Rogers Strategic Issues Forum” (speech. AUSA Conference 
and Events Center in Arlington, VA, February 7, 2017). 
2 Dave Grossman, and Loren W. Christensen. On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly 
Conflict in War and in Peace (Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, 2007) 80. 
3 Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds. America's First Battles, 1776-1965. Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1986. 
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protection provided by the weapons and delivery platforms assigned to that company. The 
goal of the UTP is the creation of what LTC (ret.) Dave Grossman correctly labeled as 
“Pre-Battle Veterans:” Soldiers that understand their enemy, comprehend the effect of their 
weapon systems, and will fight like seasoned veterans.4 
Second, an evaluation of risk management and safety doctrine, when aligned with 
the warfighting philosophy of mission command, identifies inconsistencies between the 
training environment and the operational environment. In training, the outsourcing of risk 
mitigation and safety responsibility to an agency outside the chain of command, Range 
Control, negates the commander’s training assessment, ignores the technological advances 
made to increase accuracy and limit weapons’ effects, and stifles the innovation of junior 
officers. More importantly, this centrality encourages organizational complacency and a 
“this is how we’ve always done it” mentality. As a result, Infantry units do not train for 
their combat mission; they train whatever the Range Control allows.  
Furthermore, the abdication of command authority to Range Control allows 
cognitive and perceptual biases to infect the entirety of the U.S. Army training environment 
with an inflated perception of risk. At present, U.S. doctrine frames severity in terms of 
loss. This frame of reference allows loss and feelings of disadvantage to have a more 
significant effect on one’s preference than does the feeling of gain or advantage.5 
Additionally, the paradox of risk mitigation, which states that as people become safer, they 
become more concerned about risk and they feel more vulnerable to is, compounds the 
existing “safety first” culture.6 Cognitive and perceptual biases further exaggerate this 
paradox and continually influence decision-making. Once an activity is labeled “unsafe,” 
gradual changes that decrease the risk and make the activity safer go unnoticed.7 
Unfortunately, the bureaucracy built around safety doctrine and the abdication of risk 
                                                 
4 Grossman, and. Christensen, On Combat, 74-80. 
5 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent 
Model," The quarterly journal of economics 106, no. 4 (1991): 1039. 
6 Paul Slovic, “Risk Perception and Trust” in Fundamentals of Risk Analysis and Risk Management, 
ed. Vlasta Molak (Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers, 1996), 233. 
7 Richards J. Heuer, “Chapter 2: Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception,” In Strategic 
Military Deception, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, (New York, NY: Pergamon Press Inc., 
1981), 31–69. 36-37. 
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mitigation authority permit these factors to inflate the perception of risk well beyond its 
actuality. The centrality of the system allows this inflated perception of risk to metastasize 
and infect the entirety of the training environment. Employing mission command and 
empowering junior leaders with the ability to assume and mitigate risk would prevent this 
and improve the realism required for sustained combat readiness. 
Third, the study of three U.S. Army Infantry units during the Korean War, the 
Vietnam War, and Operation JUST CAUSE, when viewed through the lenses of leadership, 
training, and technology, reveals that common shortfalls in training cost lives. Furthermore, 
each of these cases detail the training and combat performance of infantry units engaged in 
conventional, high-intensity combat. First, Task Force Smith and the 34th Infantry 
Regiment spearheaded the American effort during the Korean War. Their defeat later 
served as a rallying cry for combat readiness with the slogan “No More Task Force 
Smiths.”8 Second, a study of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry during some of fiercest conventional 
fighting in the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam highlights how a technological advantage is 
multiplied when combined with empowered leadership and realistic training. Last, the 
participation of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Operation JUST CAUSE, specifically, the 
seizure of Rio Hato Airfield, demonstrates how realistic training and effective employment 
of mission command can produce the simulator fidelity necessary to create “Pre-Battle 
Veterans” and determine victory or defeat before the battle takes place.  
While the U.S. Army’s risk mitigation doctrine, as written, is both sound and 
effective, the failure to employ this doctrine in concert with mission command in training 
withholds the authority from junior leaders to manage risk and hinders the unit’s combat 
preparation. The calculation of risk and its assumption is most effective when delegated to 
the appropriate command level. Maintaining safety as an inflexible trump card leads to the 
misalignment of the perception of risk and its genuineness. To correct this, the U.S. Army 
should take four steps to facilitate the proper employment of risk management doctrine. 
First, the U.S. Army must clarify the role of Range Control. This agency should not be the 
authority for determining shift fire lines, enforcing Minimum Safe Distances, or directing 
                                                 
8 Raymond M. Longabaugh, Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division in Korea, July 1950, 
Number ADA612249 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College School of 
Advanced Military Studies, 2014), 48. 
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training scenarios. These are tasks that U.S. Army Infantry units execute overseas as part of 
the risk management process and should belong to the appropriate commander. Second, the 
U.S. Army should streamline the Safety Waiver process. The current process is plagued 
with inefficiency such that junior leaders are forced into integrity-compromising positions. 
These officers want to do the right thing, but require the ways and means to do so. Third, 
leaders involved in the U.S. Army risk management process require education on the 
effects of risk perception and inflation. Recognizing this phenomenon is the first step in 
avoiding it. Last, senior leaders must commit to the mission command philosophy in 
training. The current centralized system of training discourages innovation, undermines 
realism, and promotes a “zero-defect” mentality in the Army. The U.S. Army’s Infantry 
leaders will be more prepared and more lethal in combat if they are empowered learn, to 
think and fight through problems in training. 
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 1 
I. IS THE U.S. ARMY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT WAR? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Army is charged to be “the world’s dominant land force” in an 
increasingly complex strategic environment.1 As U.S. strategic leaders look to the future 
and prepare the U.S. Army for the next conflict, their advice is to prepare for a war with 
“violence on the scale that the U.S. Army has not seen since Korea.”2 The Korean War 
was a “limited war,” but fought with such intensity that over 33,000 Americans lost their 
lives to combat engagements, while another 2,800 died of non-battle injuries.3 Further, in 
the Korean War, the destruction of Task Force Smith is still a reminder of the necessity 
for realistic training that simulates the expected combat environment. The men of Task 
Force Smith were the first to engage in combat with North Koreans on land. They fought 
in conditions “opposite to what American troops had become accustomed to expect” and 
were destroyed in three days of fighting.4 Since 2003, the U.S. Army fought and trained 
for wars of low-intensity conflict, not the high-intensity wars of World War II and Korea, 
the high-intensity battles of Vietnam, or for the intensity projected for the next war. 
The training required for the next conventional war must simulate the expected 
conditions, those of high-intensity conflict, as closely as possible. On the one hand, 
conditions that simulate combat are dangerous and present inherent risk. On the other 
hand, the mitigation of that risk prevents the adequate simulation of a high intensity 
combat situation. Under live fire conditions, Soldiers of the U.S. Army Infantry practice 
closing with and destroying their enemies. Members of the Airborne Infantry conduct 
personnel airdrop operations. Forward observers and joint tactical air controllers (JTACs) 
                                                 
1 Department of the Army, The Army, ADP 1, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2012), Forward. 
2 Major General William C. Hix, “General Bernard W. Rogers Strategic Issues Forum” (speech, 
AUSA Conference and Events Center in Arlington, VA, 07 February 2017). 
3 Kathleen T. Rhem, “Korean War Death Stats Highlight Modern DOD Safety Record,” American 
Forces Press Service, 8 June 2000, https://web.archive.org/web/20120114121831/http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45275. 
4 Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York, NY: Hipppocrene Books, 1986), 55–
67. 
 2 
control the release of aerial delivered munitions, artillery, and mortars. However, the 
execution of these events in the training environment is susceptible to unrealistic 
employment because of the controls implemented to mitigate the risk. Furthermore, the 
company and battalion commanders responsible for training do not have the authority to 
assume the training risk. That authority belongs to a system of rules or to an agency 
outside the chain of command.  
B. THE PROBLEM 
Broadly speaking, training under conditions that do not simulate combat creates a 
false sense of preparedness among U.S. Army Infantry units. On the contrary, realistic 
training, under conditions that mirror those in combat, creates a foundation for a unit’s 
success in combat. As stated, training U.S. Army Infantry Soldiers under live fire 
conditions is inherently dangerous. To mitigate this danger, U.S. Army Risk Management 
demands that leaders identify and control the hazards associated with training to protect 
both human life and military equipment. However, many of the controls implemented to 
mitigate the identified hazards of training change the environment such that the 
conditions no longer simulate combat and the habits formed in training maybe invalid. 
More specifically, the concept of simulator fidelity suggests that increased realism 
in training results in increased combat readiness, however, current military training 
exercises deliberately decrease training fidelity in order to mitigate risk.5 In On Combat, 
retired Army Officer and psychologist, Dave Grossman states: “Whatever is drilled in 
during training comes out the other end in combat—no more, no less.”6 Thus, if in 
combat, a low-level assault, as conducted in Grenada, requires a personnel airdrop at 500 
feet in elevation, then that is what should be executed in training.7 Similarly, the 
authorization for the employment of fires assets differ drastically from training to 
combat. In combat, an aerial delivered GBU-38 may be employed within 200 meters of a 
                                                 
5 Dave Grossman, and Loren W. Christensen. On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly 
Conflict in War and in Peace (Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, 2007), 80. 
6 Grossman and Christensen, On Combat, 75. 
7 David T. Rivard, “An Analysis of Operation Urgent Fury,” (master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff 
College Air University, 1985). 
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friendly covered position. However, in training this munition is restricted to the 
Minimum Safe Distance (MSD) of 1,100 meters.8 Additionally, the Surface Danger 
Zones (SDZs), zones centered on the gun-target line used to protect a friendly flanking or 
maneuvering element, have grown from 15 degrees to 23.6 degrees without a change in 
ammunition type, and during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These examples provide 
evidence that the controls implemented to mitigate the identified hazards of realistic 
training serve to avoid risk rather than mitigate it. Training conceived by the risk averse 
and validated by range-safety restrictions and regulations only change the training 
environment so that it no longer simulates combat.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does risk mitigation in U.S. Army tactical Infantry training affect Soldiers’ 
preparedness for conventional combat operations? 
D. EXISTING ARGUMENTS: THE DICHOTOMY OF RISK IN TRAINING 
Fight and Win. These words summarize the expectation placed upon the U.S. 
Army when the interests of the nation demand conflict in the land domain. U.S. Army 
doctrine charges ground Soldiers to “close with and destroy the enemy—room to room, 
face to face,” so that the Army can win, and win decisively.9 This form of combat is 
chaotic, personal, and permanent. In order to win, U.S. Soldiers are charged to “train as 
[they] fight,” with the implication that training environments will mirror combat 
environments as closely as possible.10 However, no training environment can, nor should, 
directly mirror combat.  
The question then becomes, how realistic should the training environment be, and 
how much risk should the U.S. Army leaders assume to ensure Soldiers are prepared to 
“close with and destroy the enemy?” There are two strong views on this question, and 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of Defense, JFIRE: Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint 
Application of Firepower (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 137. 
9 Department of the Army, The Army, 52. 
10 Department of the Army, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, FM 7–0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2008), 2–5. 
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they are in direct conflict with one another. Either assume the physical risk in training to 
simulate the combat environment or avoid the risk to prevent the injury or death of a 
Soldier. Although, this is an over simplification of the competing arguments, it 
communicates the genesis of the disagreement. First, the concept of training fidelity when 
applied to combat is well documented, especially in the fields of aviation, medicine, and 
psychology. Authors such as Dave Grossman, Bruce Siddle, Rory Miller, Kenneth 
Murray, Loren Christensen, and Michael Askin document the necessity to train as 
realistically as possible and the affect training has on the human psychology of killing. 
Grossman is famous among military and law enforcement for saying “You do not rise to 
the occasion in combat, you sink to the level of your training. Do not expect … [to be] 
capable of doing things that you never rehearsed before. It will not happen.”11  
Grossman and other supporters of “Killology” believe in the ability to create “pre-
battle veterans” by training individuals in scenarios sufficiently realistic and stressful, 
that they are prepared for the rigors of combat.12 The argument for Killology stresses 
training scenario specificity and realism; however, the focus of this argument is on the 
individual, not on the group. Further, it does not adequately address inherent dangers in a 
training environment such as personnel airdrops operations and live fire training 
exercises involving maneuver and fires. 
Opposing arguments to Killology do not dispute the need for realistic training; 
however, they contest the level of realism and stress required. Authors such as aerospace 
engineer Nicklas Dahlstron and experimental psychologist Stanley Hamstra, in their 
studies of the aviation and medical communities, believe that the aspect of simulator 
fidelity is flawed because it is situation specific.13 Further, they believe less specific 
scenario-based training would increase emphasis on task alignment, thus improving the 
trainee’s resilience.14 This argument is also valid; however, the training documented in 
                                                 
11 Grossman and Christensen, On Combat, 77. 
12 Grossman and Christensen, On Combat, 74–80. 
13 Nicklas Dahlstrom, et al., “Fidelity and Validity of Simulator Training,” Theoretical Issues in 
Ergonomics Science 10, no. 4 (2009), 305. 
14 Stanley J. Hamstra, et al. “Reconsidering Fidelity in Simulation-Based Training,” Academic 
Medicine 89, no. 3 (2014), 389. 
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the aviation community is largely done with a flight simulator and the training conducted 
by the medical community is done on manikins and in groups. In these environments, 
there is very little risk to one’s life, limb, or eye sight as seen in the training of military 
personnel, specifically, the U.S. Army Infantry. 
Attempting to define the balance between these two arguments authors accept that 
combat is inherently risky and the training to prepare for combat must also be inherently 
risky if the training environment is to resemble the combat environment.15 Matthew 
Myer and Steven Lojka, two former Infantry company commanders, compare the risk in 
combat to the risk in training in their 2012 master’s degree thesis. They use game theory 
to argue that the risk assumed in the training environment should equal the risk of the 
operational environment, plus the addition of risk imposed by the enemy.16 This 
argument closely mirrors that of Killology while considering the specific application to a 
military group. However, the work of Meyr and Lojka does not address the Army risk 
management process in its current form, nor does it address the psychological aspect of 
risk perception.  
Beyond the contemporary arguments, U.S. Army risk management, historically, is 
an afterthought, provoked by an unnecessary loss of life or equipment. In 1995, four 
students at the U.S. Army Ranger School died due to hypothermia in training.17 The 
resulting National Defense Act of 1996 required that the U.S. Army formalize risk 
management process into U.S. Army doctrine.18 In 1998, the U.S. Army published FM 
100–14, Risk Management, with the intent to “decentralize decision making and push it 
down to the lowest level,” officially making risk management all leaders’ 
responsibility.19 In today’s Army, much more responsibility is placed on organizational 
                                                 
15 Matthew Meyr and Jason Lojka, “On Risk: Risk and Decision Making in Military Combat and 
Training Environments” (master’s thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 28–29. 
16 Meyr and Lojka, “On Risk,” Abstract. 
17 Mark E. Gebicke, Army Ranger Training: Safety Improvement Need to be Institutionalized, NSIAD-
97-29 (Atlanta, GA: General Accounting Office, 1997), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-
NSIAD-97-29/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-29.htm, 2–6.  
18 Mobbs, Mike. “Above the Danger: Army Aviation and the Development of Risk Management 
Doctrine.” Army History, PB 20–17-01. Winter 2017, 33. 
19 Mobbs, “Above the Danger,” 35. 
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procedures and on the individual to identify hazards and implement safety controls.20 On 
maneuver live fire training ranges, a civilian “Range Control” determines whether the 
training event meets established standards for safety.21 Although the commander and 
Officer in Charge (OIC) determine what the training objectives are, they do not have the 
authority to overrule a safety organization that exists outside their chain of command.  
Another influence on the argument justifying the perception of risk aversion is 
ever changing technology. Advances in technology can provide advantages on the 
battlefield and often increase the distance between service members and the dangers of 
combat. The observation airplane gave way to the bomber and the unmanned persistent 
strike assets of today. The musket led to the development of the rifle and machine gun 
increasing both the range and precision with which ground forces can engage the enemy. 
Additionally, advances in body armor and combat medicine have drastically reduced the 
numbers of combat fatalities. The effect of these technological advances directly impact 
military activity in both training and combat. The wounded-to-fatality rate during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was 16:1, compared to 3:1 in the Vietnam conflict, and 2:1 
during the Korean War.22 However, these changes in technology have not changed the 
necessity to assume and mitigate risk in training. Success in warfare is not a matter of 
superior weapons; the advancement of weapons is cyclical.23  
As one combatant implements a superior technology, the adversary adapts either 
advancing the technology or defeating it.24 This is adversarial adaptation cycle is evident 
in the procurement of armored vehicles and the lethality of the Improvised Explosive 
Devise (IED) in the Global War on Terror. Vehicles such as the Mine-Resistant Ambush 
                                                 
20 Department of the Army, Risk Management, ATP 5–19 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2014), 2-1. 
21 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Range Safety Manual, DA PAM 385–63 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2014); the United States Marine Corps also adheres to this manual. 
22 Matthew S. Goldberg, “Death and Injury Ranges of U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq,” Military 
Medicine 175. No. 4 (April 2010), 221. 
23 Harry Holbert and Turney High, “The Form and Function of Weapons” in Primitive War: Its 
Practices and Concepts. 5–38. (Princeton, NJ: University of South Carolina Press, 1971) 10–15. 
24 The Red Queen Hypothesis, proposed by Leigh Van Valen, suggests that species adapt to gain an 
advantage and survive, when competing with other evolving organisms; Leigh Van Valen, “A New 
Evolutionary Law.” Evolutionary Theory, 1–30. 1973. 
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Protected (MRAP) were fielded to decrease casualties, but created new risks.25 The 
MRAP is a defensive vehicle with a V-shaped hull to deflect the blast of the IED away 
from the passengers inside the troop compartment. It has one machine gun mounted on 
top and the troop ramp takes seven seconds to descend, an eternity in combat. Another 
option would have been the Stryker Infantry Combat Variant. It has a double V-shaped 
hull, has one mounted remote weapon system (RWS), and the ability to mount an 
additional three machine guns. The Stryker holds 11 personnel, large enough for an entire 
Infantry squad of nine, and the troop ramp drops in two seconds. It is offensive, built to 
protect the passengers, as they close with and destroy the enemy.26 Despite the offensive 
nature of Stryker, the MRAP was the vehicle selected for employment in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Instead of fighting the enemy, the U.S. Army used technology to increase 
protection and avoid the fires of the enemy, a denial of ground Soldiers’ core mission—
offensive operations.27 This approach to risk management, reducing exposure to risk, 
increases risk aversion, decreases Soldier resiliency, and contravenes the core mission of 
the U.S. Army.28 These advances in technology and efforts to avoid the risks of combat 
are evidence of the increasing value on human life and increased risk aversion.  
The paradox of risk mitigation is that as people become safer, they become more 
concerned about risk and more vulnerable to risk.29 Unfortunately, the more vulnerable 
people feel to risk, the more difficult realistic training becomes because improper training 
or training void of risk increases the risk in combat.30 Political scientist, Yaacov 
Vertzberger, in Risk Taking and Decision Making writes, “Risk avoidance in the short 
                                                 
25 Robert Gates (former U.S. Secretary of Defense), in public discussion with Dr. John Arquilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 05 January 2017. 
26 The author served 25 months in Iraq and 16 in Afghanistan as U.S. Army Infantry platoon leader 
and Infantry company commander. He conducted combat operations with both MRAPs and Strykers. 
27 Lawrence Basha, “An Examination of Overt Offensive Military Operations Outside of Combat 
Zones.” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 42. 
28 Simon Wessely, “Risk, Psychiatry and the Military.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 186, no 6 
(2005), 459. 
29 Slovic, “Risk Perception and Trust,” 233. 
30 Meyr and Lojka, “On Risk,” 27. 
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run may turn out to be a very risky decision.”31 His point, when applied to military 
training, is that the act of avoiding risk in training only incurs risk in combat. As 
previously stated, the training environment must simulate the combat environment as 
closely as possible if the military is going to “train as [it] fights.” When Soldiers and their 
leaders face risk in training, and mitigate that risk during the execution of their mission, 
the trust between leader and Soldier is fostered and developed increasing the efficiency of 
an organization. 
Despite the significant volume of literature addressing the balance between safety 
and realism in training, a gap remains between the authority to assume risk and the effect 
current risk mitigation practices have on combat preparation for the U.S. Army’s tactical 
units in the next war. The following chapters examine the training practices and 
procedures for a U.S. Army Infantry company, the current doctrine used to analyze and 
mitigate risk, existing safety regulations, and historical examples of U.S. Army Infantry 
unit’s effectiveness in their “First Battles.”32 This report concludes with 
recommendations to improve the training of U.S. Army Infantry companies as they 
prepare for the nation’s next war.  
                                                 
31 Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision Making: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 25. 
32 Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds. America’s First Battles, 1776–1965. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1986. 
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II. TRAINING A U.S. ARMY INFANTRY COMPANY FOR 
COMBAT 
In a speech to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Major General 
William Hix stated that the Army must train to win the first battle of the next war.33 
However, an observer/coach/trainer (O/C/T) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center 
believes U.S. Army Units are not as prepared for combat as some multinational partners 
because of a failed emphasis on training.34 U.S. Army Colonel (Ret.) Douglas 
Macgregor, a decorated combat veteran and military historian believes that America is 
“going to lose the first battle of the next war,” and supports this assertion.35 In the 
twenty-first century, “America may not get a chance to fight a second battle.”36 
Historically, the U.S. Army’s record of first battles is mixed and certainly not without 
loss. Task Force Smith is an example of a unit destroyed in the first American 
engagement of the Korean War due, in large part, to a lack of training and preparation.  
A. LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING TASK DEVELOPMENT 
Training and preparing for future combat are contingent upon understanding what 
the next fight will look like. Major General Hix also stated in his speech to the AUSA 
that “we should expect levels of violence and lethality … at a tempo unseen in history.”37 
Training an Infantry company is a daunting task that attempts to understand the next 
conflict through in-depth analysis of the mission, the environment, the tasks necessary to 
train, and of current training proficiency. Failure to sufficiently predict what the next 
conflict holds may result in catastrophic defeat. Moreover, the responsibility to 
accomplish the aforementioned and prepare a company to win the first battle of the next 
                                                 
33 William C. Hix, “General Bernard W. Rogers Strategic Issues Forum” (speech, AUSA Conference 
and Events Center in Arlington, VA, February 7, 2017), https://www.ausa.org/rogers-forum-mg-hix. 
34 Scott Metz, “Overtasking and Its Effect on Platoon and Company Tactical Proficiency: An 
Opposing Forces and Observer/Coach/Trainer Perspective,” Armor (Spring 2017), 
http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2017/Spring/2Metz17.pdf. 
35 Douglas Macgregor, “Why America’s Army Is Falling Apart,” The National Interest, 17 July 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-americas-army-falling-apart-21546. 
36 Macgregor, “Why America’s Army Is Falling Apart.” 
37 Hix, “Strategic Issues Forum.” 
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war belongs to one individual in the company—the commander. The following chapter 
examines the training of a U.S. Army Infantry company within the confines of leadership, 
organization, and technology to provide a better understanding of the process used to 
prepare U.S. Army infantrymen for combat. 
1. The Role of the Company Commander 
While the hierarchy is leadership in the U.S. Army is extensive, the company 
commander is the highest-ranking member and prescribed leader of the Infantry 
company. He is responsible for “everything the Infantry company does, or fails to do.”38 
However, leadership and command are not synonymous. Rather, they necessarily 
complement one another, especially in an Infantry company. Leadership is instilling the 
motivation, determination, and discipline in subordinates to accomplish the litany of tasks 
for which the commander is responsible. Leadership allows the commander to establish 
an atmosphere of trust where subordinates feel empowered to exercise initiative within 
the confines of the commander’s intent; a concept the army calls mission command.39 
Command provides the authority to issue orders, but it is leadership that combines 
personal attributes and competencies that inspire Soldiers to exercise initiative while 
following orders.40 To command without leadership is captured in the “Do as I say, not 
as I do” mantra.41 Personal presence, subject matter expertise, and the integrity to 
acknowledge one’s limitations are essential aspects of leadership that propel one’s ability 
to command. 
In the peacetime environment, the Commander is responsible for unit training.42 
Further defined, unit training is the “deployment and execution of progressive, 
                                                 
38 Department of the Army, SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, ATP 3–21.11 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2016), 1–16. 
39 Department of the Army, Mission Command, ADP 6–0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2014). 
40 Department of the Army, Army Leadership, ADP 6–22 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2012), 4-8. 
41 Kenneth E. Lloyd, "Do as I say, not as I do" The Behavior Analyst 17, no. 1 (1994): 131. 
42 Department of the Army, Training Units and Developing Leaders, ADP 7–0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2012), 1–1. 
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challenging, and realistic training.”43 Through dialogue with the chain of command, 
analysis of the mission, and consultation with doctrine, the commander must determine 
the Mission Essential Tasks (METs) required to be successful in conducting the mission 
and supporting the mission of the higher headquarters. The mission analysis and 
commander’s dialogue result in a finalized Mission Essential Task List (METL) that 
guides the unit training plan. Next, the commander must plan, resource, and execute 
training events that ultimately result in the preparation of the Infantry company for future 
combat. Finally, the commander is responsible for assessing the company and gauging 
whether or not the company is trained, practiced, or untrained.44 The number and weight 
of these responsibilities can be onerous; perhaps this is why a company commander in his 
late 20s or early 30s is referred to as “the old man.”45 
While the mantle of command is burdensome, it is also rewarding. The 
aforementioned responsibilities and excerpts from doctrine dictate those things company 
commanders must do, but they do not suggest why they do it. Certainly, some officers 
that know that command is a rung on the ladder to the next promotion and pay raise. 
However, U.S. Army Colonel (Ret.) Keith Nightengale, the commander of four Infantry 
companies and a veteran of both Vietnam and Grenada, suggests that commanders 
assume this responsibility for “their love of their troops.”46 Nightengale believes good 
commanders establish a pseudo-family dynamic, where the love of troops manifests itself 
in the demand for performance and shared hardship because this provides the Soldiers the 
best opportunity to survive the dangers of combat.47 This assertion is supported by 
journalist Ernie Pyle’s essay, “The Death of Captain Waskow,” which artfully conveys 
                                                 
43 Department of the Army, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 1–4. 
44 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, FM 7–0 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, 2016), 1–2. 
45 Douglas V. Johnson II, This is Not Your Father’s, or Mother’s Army (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2004). https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=665. 
46 Keith Nightingale, “How Can A Commander Love His Troops and Yet Send Them To Their 
Deaths?,” Foreign Policy, 3 February 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/03/how-can-a-commander-
love-his-troops-and-yet-send-them-to-their-deaths?/. 
47 Nightingale. “How Can A Commander Love His Troops.” 
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the impact a company commander can have when the leader proves worthy of the led.48 
Soldiers will not put their lives on the line for a PowerPoint slide or some computer text. 
Nor will they respect an officer who does not share in their hardship and give them the 
best possible chance to both fight and win. While the burden of command is heavy, a 
good commander appreciates the indescribable reward of serving at the head of a high 
performing organization where the Soldiers would die before they fail.  
2. Company Organization and Information Flow 
Despite the Commander’s sole responsibility for the Infantry company, he is far 
from alone in the everyday leadership of the company. First, the company First Sergeant 
(1SG), usually a seasoned veteran with 16–18 years of military service, is responsible for 
the health, morale, and welfare of the enlisted Soldiers. Moreover, he is the senior 
warfighter and the company will look to him for example and advice. Next, the company 
Executive Officer (XO), a senior Lieutenant or junior Captain with just enough 
experience as an officer to serve as a sounding board for the company commander, serves 
as the second in command (2IC). Additionally, the XO is often tasked with oversight of 
company property and resource procurement to support the commander’s training plan. 
The strength of this leadership triad may determine the effectiveness of an Infantry 
company.  
Efficiency in an Infantry company demands delegation and trust to ensure the 
integrity of information feedback. The commander must trust the advice and opinion of 
the 1SG regarding the training proficiency of the company. This training assessment 
determines the training plan the XO must resource. Following training events, the 
adjustments to the training plan occur when subordinate leaders in the company provide 
their own feedback in the form of an After Action Review (AAR). The Commander’s 
ability to set a course with a training endstate and adjust course based of the information 
received from his senior enlisted counterpart and his subordinate leaders lays the 
                                                 
48 Ernie Pyle, “The Death of Captain Waskow” in Ernie’s War: The Best of Ernie Pyle’s World War II 
Dispatches, ed. David Nichols, 1944, pp. 195–197, http://isite.lps.org/ngeiken/web/documents/
USH2_Ch18_Sec2_Death_of_Captain_Waskow_000.pdf. 
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foundation for trust. The necessity of trust in combat units is well documented; however, 
this trust relationship is not forged in combat. It is forged in training.  
3. Mission Essential Task List Development 
Effective Infantry training is determined with measurement against the unit’s 
Mission-Essential Task List (METL). A mission-essential task (MET) is “a task a unit 
could perform based on its design, equipment, manning, and table of organization.”49 
The METL is the compilation of the METs. According to Army Training Network, all 
Infantry companies have a standardized METL that dictate five METs necessary to 
accomplish the mission of “close with the enemy by means of maneuver to destroy or 
capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.”50 The five 
standardized tasks associated with this mission are Conduct an Area Defense, Conduct a 
Movement to Contact, Conduct an Attack, Conduct Area Security, Conduct 
Expeditionary Deployment Operations in Support of the Offense, Defense, Stability and 
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).51 These tasks are broad, and their 
accomplishment requires the completion of a number of subordinate tasks called “battle 
tasks which are trained and evaluated using the standardized Army Training and 
Evaluation Program (ARTEP).”52 The Infantry unit cannot train every subordinate task, 
therefore, the commander is responsible for considering the higher unit’s mission, the 
METL, and specific guidance on the selection of collective tasks to choose those that are 
most important and/or are subordinate tasks of multiple METs.53 This process is the 
METL “crosswalk,” and the outputs are a METL with supporting battle tasks, and a draft 
unit-training plan that describes how the unit will become proficient on each of the 
METs.  
                                                 
49 Department of the Army, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 3–2. 
50 Department of the Army, Infantry Platoon and Squad, ATP 3–21.8, Change 1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2016) 1–1. 
51 “Standardized METL,” Army Training Network, accessed 28 September 2017, https://atn.army.mil/
dsp_DA_Standardized_METL.aspx. 
52 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, 1–44. 
53 Department of the Army, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 3–3. 
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While the U.S. Army dictates METL for the Infantry brigade and above and 
provides a standardized METL for Infantry companies, METL is neither dictated nor 
standardized at the Infantry battalion or Infantry company. The result is significant 
variety in both METL and company training plans across Infantry companies. This lack 
of standardization places a premium on the company commander’s mission analysis and 
understanding of the operational environmental. Further, the Infantry company 
commander must maintain an open dialogue with the Infantry battalion commander to 
ensure the non-standard METL properly supports the battalion’s METL.  
In addition to nonstandard METLs, Infantry companies must exercise tasks 
specific to their type of Infantry—Airborne, Air Assault, Mechanized, Light, and Stryker. 
These METs are a byproduct of the mission dictated to the higher HQs and the delivery 
platform used to get Soldiers to the fight. As a result, Airborne Infantry companies will 
add METs such as “Conduct Airborne Operations” and “Conduct Airfield Seizure” with 
supporting battle tasks such as “Conduct an Airborne Assault” and “Conduct Airborne 
Insertion.”54 Similarly, a Stryker Infantry company will add METs such as “Execute 
Gunnery,” “Execute MGS (Mobile Gun System) Gunnery.” These tasks are specific to 
the Remote Weapon System (RWS) on Infantry Carrying Variants (ICVs) and MGS 
variants. Additionally, each of the METs, standard and non-standard, will have the 
supporting battle tasks specific to the delivery platform such as Driver’s Training. The 
same is true for a Mechanized Infantry company where additional METs and battle tasks 
are added to ensure collective training specific to M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and its 
weapon systems. 
Similar to previous METs, tasks such as “Conduct Air Assault” are specific to a 
platform, but no longer specific to an Infantry type. The Soldiers of the 101st Airborne at 
Fort Campbell, Kentucky, pride themselves on being Air Assault Infantry. However, 
every Infantry company can add “Conduct Air Assault” as a company MET. An 
understanding of and a proficiency with rotary-wing transportation is necessary for all 
Infantry units. The helicopter is the primary form of MEDEVAC and resupply in denied 
                                                 
54 “Combined Arms Training Strategies,” Army Training Network, accessed 09 July 2017, 
https://atn.army.mil/dsp_CATSviewer01.aspx#. 
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terrain. Further, it can increase mobility, and protection, by bypassing restricted or enemy 
held terrain.  
However, every MET and its associated battle tasks requires resources, time, and 
expertise if it is to be trained to standard. Commanders will seldom have the time 
required to train every necessary task to proficiency. Therefore, the commander must 
analyze the mission, dialogue with the higher unit, and provide his unit the battle focus 
necessary to accomplish the mission. The Mission Essential Task and follow-on METL 
along with the higher HQs mission, includes a focus on the unit’s delivery platform, and 
provides a framework on which the commander builds the unit training plan. When the 
METL is complete, the commander must, again, reassess the proficiency of the company 
on each task, and determine the level of proficiency the company must achieve.55 
Doctrinally, the commander assesses each MET as a variation of T (trained), P 
(practiced), or U (untrained).56 This projected assessment forms the basis of the 
commander’s vision for training.  
4. The Army Force Generation Model 
Achieving the commander’s vision is done through unit training management, 
another one of the Commander’s responsibilities. However, steadiness in the manning 
process is a product of the Army Force Generation Model. In 2006, the Army transitioned 
from a linear system that emphasized “tiered readiness” to circular system that 
emphasized “progressive readiness.”57 The current model, the Army Force Generation 
(ARFORGEN), restructured Army manning to accommodate for recurring deployments 
in support of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. In theory, the life cycle of a unit is divided 
into three phases: Reset, Trained/Ready, and Available. During the Reset period, the unit 
focuses on manning, repairing and fielding equipment, individual training, and limited 
collective training. The intent is for the unit to be fully manned, fully equipped, and 
                                                 
55 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, 2-16 – 2-18. 
56 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, 2-17. 
57 “Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Overview,” Army Training Network, 08 February 2011, 
accessed 09 July 2017, https://atn.army.mil/Media/fouodocs/ARFORGEN%20%20Overview.pdf. 
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proficient on the individual level tasks before the end of the Reset period.58 During the 
Trained/Ready phase, units focus on platform specific training, collective training, and 
mission rehearsal exercises. Following the Trained/Ready phase, units enter the Available 
phase and either deploy in support of a combatant commander’s requirements or remain 
postured to support contingency operations.59  
The ARFORGEN cycle is important to an Infantry company commander because 
it provides the generic timeline and manning stabilization to achieve higher collective 
training. During the Reset period, it is expected that key leaders will leave the unit, 
seasoned Soldiers will complete their time in service, and the overall combat experience 
and effectiveness of the unit will drop. Therefore, a commander must reset the company 
with the arrival of new leaders, the promotion of high performing Soldiers, and the 
training of new Soldiers recently arrived from basic training. The company uses the reset 
period to training individual tasks such as rifle marksmanship, medical proficiency, 
communications, and physical training. Toward the end of the reset period, the 
commander will progress training to include crew, and team level training on key weapon 
systems and mobility platforms. In theory, the manning and equipment shortages are 
rectified by the start of the Train/Ready phase. This allows the commander to advance 
both the frequency and intensity of training with the goal of achieving the commander’s 
vision for training prior to the Available Phase. Although the ARFORGEN cycle does not 
dictate the unit training plan or timeline, it provides and sets the personnel and equipment 
necessary for the commander to advance an Infantry company from individual training 
proficiency to collective training proficiency. 
5. Training—Creating “Pre-Battle Veterans” 
Training proficiency, whether individual or collective, must be realistic if the 
endstate is a deployment or contingency operation. Through realistic training, Infantry 
company commanders can incorporate “the human, cultural, and political aspects of 
armed conflict” and simulate the stress of persistent threat associated with the 
                                                 
58 Army Training Network, “Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Overview.” 
59 Army Training Network, “Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Overview.” 
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environment.60 U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Dave Grossman, a combat 
psychologist, believes in the ability to create “pre-battle veterans” by designing training 
that is both sufficiently realistic and stressful.61 Overcoming this stress and achieving 
training objectives, under conditions that mirror the operational environment, is what 
establishes Soldiers’ attitudes and behavior such that skills and practices developed in 
training are applicable to combat. As mentioned previously, Infantry companies cannot 
immediately conduct large-scale, collective training events due to limitations of the 
ARFORGEN cycle, and the need to build individual training proficiency before 
progressing to collective level training.  
Collective training requires a progression referred to as the “Crawl-Walk-Run” 
methodology with a series of Force-on-Force and Live Fire Exercises with increasing 
Fires and enabler integration to achieve the realism expected of the operational 
environment. The implementation of the Crawl-Walk-Run methodology is contingent 
upon the Commander’s assessment of MET proficiency. The higher the unit’s proficiency 
in a task, the less time it will spend in the crawl and walk phase, and the more time it will 
spend in the run phase. The crawl phase of training is marked by leader explanation and 
demonstration of the task. Systematically, unit leaders highlight the performance 
measures required for the task to be accomplished according to a prescribed standard.62 
The walk phase is the practice phase, where the unit executes the task, often one-step at a 
time, with increasing pace.63 This phase is usually accomplished without the stress of an 
opposing force, or combat effects, so that units can build proficiency on the task without 
the added distractions.  
                                                 
60 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, A-1. 
61 Dave Grossman, and Loren W. Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly 
Conflict in War and in Peace (Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, 2007), 74–80. 
62 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, E-30-E-33. 
63 Department of the Army, Train to Win in a Complex World, E-34. 
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Combat is often chaotic, and it is possible to “be scared speechless.”64 Therefore, 
rehearsing all aspects of a task is necessary, including what to say and when. This will 
increase the Soldiers’ confidence and limit the potential for chaos to affect the mission. 
The run phase is the time to test the unit at “combat speed” and under realistic 
conditions.65 The run phase should mirror combat as closely as possible to increase 
simulator fidelity and better prepare Soldiers for combat. Finally, no army training is 
complete without reflection and retraining. The AAR permits a unit to review the task 
performance and identify how to improve future performance.66 Retraining ensures the 
unit meets the established standard prior to concluding training.67 The Crawl-Walk-Run 
methodology applies to all training events. Further, it emphasizes proficiency with 
individual skills, and the basics of collective action as the foundation upon which realistic 
training is possible. At the conclusion of training cycles, infantry companies are tested 
under both force-on-force and live fire conditions designed to simulate combat 
environments. Failure to build proficiency from the individual through the collective risks 
failure during these validation exercises. 
Force-on-Force Training provides the opportunity to train METs against a 
freethinking opposing force (OPFOR), increasing the realism and simulator-fidelity of 
the training event. Training that is more realistic results in better preparation. However, 
there is disagreement regarding how realistic training must be. Force-on-Force training 
provides U.S. Army Infantry companies the ability to train command and control 
mechanisms and stress responses in realistic scenarios and in a realistic environment. The 
training is non-lethal, therefore the risk to personnel and infrastructure is extremely low. 
Further, the lack of munitions creates a variety of training options because Force-on-
Force training can occur anywhere troops are allowed. While beneficial for executing 
realistic and stressful scenarios, the lack of munitions creates a significant gap in the 
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training. This method does not evaluate marksmanship, and poorly evaluates individual, 
crew, and team drills. This deficiency was first highlighted by S.L.A. Marshall in his 
study Men Against Fire when he concluded that “less than 25 percent of our infantry line 
employed hand weapons effectively when under fire.”68 Further, Force-on-Force may 
advance bad training habits because a lack of munitions creates room for the 
misunderstanding of weapons effects and capabilities. What constitutes enemy 
suppression and target destruction? What rounds will penetrate an eight-inch adobe wall? 
Although doctrine provides definitions, an understanding of weapons’ effects and 
capabilities gained through experience in the training environment is essential if an 
Infantry unit is preparing for combat. 
Live Fire Training Exercises (LFXs) provide the means to evaluate marksmanship 
and understand weapons’ effects; however, the lethality of live munitions severely 
restricts the realism and the role of unit leadership. Live Fire Exercises are often the 
“run” event as a platoon and/or company progresses through its training plan, further, 
these exercises may serve to certify or validate a unit for combat. Units are able to 
evaluate the marksmanship and weapons proficiency of its Soldiers, while assessing the 
effect of the different weapons systems on various targets.  
However, restrictions administered during a LFX severely hinder its training 
value. Most targets are stationary, the direction of the attack is usually scripted, and 
Observer/Controllers (OCs) move with each maneuver element and crew served weapon 
system often dictating how the execution should go. Moreover, each unit must execute 
the same scenario, with the same target placement, six times to be considered trained. As 
a result, the live fire exercise is often an unrealistic portrayal of a combat situation and a 
poor evaluation of a unit in both planning and execution. 
Given the aforementioned, realistic training is necessary for U.S. Army Infantry 
units that desire “pre-battle veterans” prior to the Trained/Ready phase of the 
ARFORGEN cycle. However, both the degree of realism and the ability to make training 
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realistic provide hurdles to achieving this goal. Force-on-Force training allows for the 
evaluation of subordinate leaders and command and control mechanisms in realistic 
situations, but the cost of is the inability to evaluate marksmanship, assess weapons’ 
effects, or synchronize fires. Live fire exercises are the opposite. They assess 
marksmanship, weapons effects, and fires synchronization, but often lack the necessary 
realism. While the lethality of using live munitions limits realism, the restrictions placed 
on the conduct of live fire exercises further reduces the simulator fidelity by adding 
controls and procedures that do not exist in the combat environment. The result is 
unrealistic scenarios and untested leaders. Despite this reality, the live fire exercise often 
serves as the “run” event of an Infantry company’s training cycle. Infantrymen are 
certified and validated for combat using live fire events, when in fact these Soldiers have 
only endured a scripted scenario six times in a row. These obstacles to effective training 
requires address so that training cycles produce leaders and Soldiers prepared to fight and 
win the nation’s next war.  
B. TECHNOLOGY—“THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF WAR”: BALANCING 
LETHALITY, MOBILITY, AND PROTECTION 
The need to understand and master new technology augments the aforementioned 
training progression, Crawl-Walk-Run, during the Reset phase of the ARFORGEN cycle. 
Historian Martin van Creveld in Technology and War maintains that technology, as the 
“infrastructure of war,” not only permeates war, but it also governs it.69 Presently, the 
different forms and uses of technology define the branches of the U.S. Army Infantry. 
The following section examines three aspects of Infantry equipment—delivery platforms, 
optics and night vision, and personal protective equipment—and how these aspects affect 
the combat preparation of an Infantry company. Delivery platforms are the ways and 
means infantrymen close with, and in many cases, destroy the enemy. Optics and night-
vision devices increase the precision of enemy engagement, during all hours of the day, 
without a decrease in lethality. Personal protective equipment affects the Soldiers’ load 
and performance, while increasing his chances for survival. While technology is always 
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advancing, it is not always advantageous. Van Creveld is correct in saying that 
technology permeated war; however, his implication that the technological advantage 
determines the victor is not correct. It is the responsibility of the commander to determine 
how to employ technological advances such that the balance between lethality, mobility, 
and protection remains tipped in his favor.  
1. Ground Delivery Platforms 
The iconic infantryman is the Soldier with a helmet on his head, a rifle in his 
hand, and a rucksack on his back—the light infantryman. However, the Infantry branch 
diversified to create niche capabilities that mitigate enemy strengths and capitalize on 
weaknesses using a variety of delivery platforms.70 The platforms require specific 
training and, to some extent, specify the type of enemy the different forms of Infantry—
Mechanized, Motorized, Air Assault, Airborne, and Stryker—must train to combat. 
The Mechanized Infantry fight with the M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
(BFV), which provides the means for infantrymen to fight alongside the Abrams tank.71 
The Bradley’s advantages includes the lethality to engage armored vehicles, cross-
country mobility in all weather conditions, and reactive armor that provides protection 
against both anti-armor and small arms threats. The disadvantages include an undersized 
troop compartment, and its considerable weight of 27 tons. As a result, the BFV only 
transports seven combat equipped infantrymen, limiting either the control mechanisms or 
organic firepower of the transported squad. Additionally, its heavy weight prevents its 
mass transport by air such that it cannot readily aid Infantry units with global response 
assignments. The training for Mechanized infantrymen demands proficiency with driving 
the BFV, operating the 25mm chain gun and anti-armor missiles, dismounting and 
maneuvering this vehicle in concert with ground troops, and maintaining this platform in 
austere conditions. These platform specific tasks, in addition to the individual and 
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collective tasks that all Infantry units must train, require realistic training that simulates a 
combat environment.  
While Mechanized Infantry is often called “heavy” because of the Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle, the “light” infantry doctrinally do not have dedicated delivery 
platforms, but rely on foot mobility to close with the enemy. A Light Infantry unit is 
authorized three vehicles—two High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) 
and one Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV). The two HMMVWs are command and 
control platforms and the LMTV is a resupply platform.72 The lack of vehicles allows 
Light Infantry units to move through extremely restrictive terrain and avoid the natural 
canalizing of roads. However, foot movement, especially in rough terrain, is slow, 
approximately two miles per hour. Moreover, the only weapons and ammunition 
immediately available to a Light Infantry unit is what the Soldiers can carry. While 
dismounted mobility has its advantages, long distances, minimal supplies, or superior 
enemy weapons can negate this advantage. Examples of this phenomenon are the 
contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations required Light Infantry 
units move faster and conduct prolonged operations, therefore, Light Infantry, as well as 
Airborne and Air Assault Infantry, became Motorized Infantry and used HMMVWs as 
their delivery platform. 
The Motorized Infantry concept germinated from the World War II Armored 
Personnel Carrier (APC) concept.73 A defensive concept, the APC served to increase the 
protection of the Infantry force during its transport, but did little to increase its lethality. 
Unlike World War II, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan exposed the vulnerability of the HMMVW and resulted in the procurement 
of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.74 Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates was the main proponent for MRAPs, citing the safety they provided for their 
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passengers against roadside bombs.75 MRAPs featured a raised V-shaped hull designed 
to deflect the blast of IEDs, mines, and fragmentation.76 Though the MRAP significantly 
reduced casualties, it also reduced both the mobility and lethality of the Motorized 
Infantry. The MRAP was a temporary procurement for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a 
means to minimize the casualties inflicted by roadside bombs. Despite the reasons for 
procurement, the requirement for training remained. Motorized Infantry requires driving 
proficiency, a mastery of convoy operations, and gunnery training. In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, most of this training occurred after arrival in the theater of conflict and on-
the-job. 
Whereas the APC concept was too defensive and the mechanized concept too 
heavy, the U.S. Army shot the gap with the development of the Stryker Infantry 
Carrier.77 The Stryker was an eight-wheeled answer to the considerable weight of the 
tracked Bradley and the lethality limitations of the APC/MRAP concept, providing a new 
“rapidly air-deployed force to meet distant contingencies.”78 The Stryker maintained the 
protection against IEDs with a dual-V-hull, and improved on the APC design with the 
adoption of the Remote Weapon System (RWS). It transports an entire Infantry squad, 
and has the armament to destroy lightly armored vehicles.79 Moreover, like the Bradley, 
the Stryker has an offensive capability. Air guard hatches allow the transported 
infantrymen to provide additional armament and 360-degree security. For all of its 
advantages, however, the Stryker is not a fighting vehicle and cannot protect against the 
anti-armor attacks expected from a near-peer military in a conventional conflict situation. 
Like all delivery platforms, the Stryker demands specific training requirements. Unlike 
the Motorized Infantry, by way of contrast, Stryker Infantry units maintain access to their 
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vehicles throughout the training cycle providing the time to build proficiency on tasks 
specific to employment of the platform. 
The final two Infantry types—Air Assault and Airborne Infantry—prioritize 
mobility over protection using the helicopter and the parachute as delivery platforms. Air 
Assault Infantry, formerly Air Mobile Infantry, use the utility helicopter (UH-60) and 
cargo helicopter (CH-47) for insertion and extraction. These platforms demonstrated such 
versatility in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that all Infantry now train insertion, 
extraction, and close combat air (CCA) with rotary-wing aviation. The helicopter 
provides point-to-point transportation with the ability to avoid roads and enemy 
controlled ground. Additionally, the helicopter inserts the assault force assembled and 
task organized so that it can immediately achieve a fighting formation. The disadvantage 
is the vulnerability provided by the lack of protection. Helicopters lack the armor to 
protect against small arms and rocket attacks. The increased mobility, decreased 
protection, and minimal armament makes the helicopter a prime target for both advanced 
and rudimentary air defense systems during friendly insertion, extraction, and resupply. 
During the Vietnam War, more than 3,000 UH-1 helicopters were destroyed resulting in 
nearly 3,000 U.S. casualties.80 More recently, EXTORTION 17, an MH-47 shot down by 
a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) in Wardak, Afghanistan in 2011, killing all 38 service 
members on board.81 Training with helicopters is more than getting on and off the 
aircraft. At the individual level, tactical units require sling load, air assault, and 
pathfinder experts to understand the nuances of each aircraft and how to use it for 
insertion, extraction, medical evacuation, and resupply. Training collective tasks in 
support of security at the Landing Zone (LZ) and Pickup Zone (PZ) is essential to protect 
the aircraft from enemy effects when it is most vulnerable. Finally, training the air to 
ground integration of fires is essential to support the security of the aircraft and the 
ground force.  
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Similar to the helicopter, the parachute provides the means to deliver Airborne 
Infantry after overflying enemy controlled territory. Airborne insertions provide 
commanders the flexibility to place infantrymen behind enemy lines or onto key enemy 
infrastructure such as an air field. Once paratroopers exit the aircraft, their only armament 
is their personal weapon attached to their harness, and the only protection is the body 
armor in their rucksack. Paratroopers land on the drop zone scattered and must first 
assemble prior to assaulting their objectives. Paratroopers and aircraft are most 
vulnerable during the execution of the airborne insertion. The aircraft must drop in 
elevation to the jump height, usually 800–1200 feet, and it must slow to a speed of 130 
knots. The slow moving aircraft at low altitude is a target for air defense systems. In 
addition, the paratroopers must trust that their parachute is sound, that it was rigged 
properly, and that the jumpmaster controls the exits to minimize mid-air collisions.82 The 
paratrooper lands at a speed between 19–22ft per second and conducts a parachute 
landing fall (PLF) to avoid injury. Finally, the unit must assemble into a fighting 
formation before it can continue its mission. Airborne Infantry is the most similar to 
Light Infantry; however, there are both individual and collective tasks that require 
distinct training proficiency. At the individual level, every paratrooper must be 
parachutist qualified; only achieved by graduation of the U.S. Army Airborne School at 
Fort Benning, Georgia. At least four personnel in each aircraft load must be qualified as 
jumpmasters, achieved through graduation from the U.S. Army Jumpmaster School. 
Additionally, each paratrooper must make a parachute jump at least once every three 
months, and a minimum of four times each year, to maintain his qualification. 
Collectively, every Airborne Unit must familiarize their troops on all aircraft that serve as 
jump platforms. Airborne Infantry units train to seize and secure hostile airfields.  
While each delivery platform defines an Infantry role, each also provides a niche 
capability that provides a balance between mobility, lethality, and protection and 
provides a set of advantages and disadvantages. Thorough analysis of the enemy’s 
capabilities determines how to mitigate his strengths and capitalize on his weaknesses 
with available technologies. Mechanized Infantry are essential in the fight against an 
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armored force. The increased protection and lethality of the BFV platform, combined 
with the flexibility of a dismounted element, is essential to reconnaissance and anti-tank 
capabilities in a near-peer conflict, as demonstrated during Israel’s Yom Kippur War.83 
Stryker Infantry and Air Assault Infantry provide significant advantages over weaker 
enemies and hostile populations. The helicopter provides a mobility advantage that 
bypasses enemy IEDs and inserts an assault force in positions of advantage over the 
enemy. The Stryker provides both protection against IEDs, and increased lethality 
engaging lightly armored vehicles. However, it is not a well-armored fighting vehicle and 
it is vulnerable to anti-armor attacks of a near-peer armored force. Finally, the Airborne 
Infantry serve to fight long range mobility is essential in order to breach or bypass enemy 
defenses. Each delivery platform emphasizes the technological balance between lethality, 
mobility, and protection; however, each demands extensive and specific training so that 
infantrymen can employ each platform with maximum effectiveness.  
2. Optics and Night Vision 
Similar to the balanced technological advantages provided by various delivery 
platforms, advances in optics and night vision capability also provide advantages in 
mobility, lethality, and protection. The ability to see an enemy at night and accurately 
engage him from distances at which he cannot engage provides advantages to both the 
individual Soldier and the collective fighting unit. To provide sight advantages, every 
infantryman is equipped with a rifle sight and a night-vision device. The rifle sight may 
provide magnification and/or faster target acquisition. The Advanced Combat Optical 
Gunsight (ACOG) affords “enhanced target identification and hit probability out to 
800m.”84 Similarly, sights with a parallax lens or “red dot sight,” such as the EO-Tech 
and the M68, reduce the need for a strict sight picture when engaging, and allow the 
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shooter to engage near targets faster and with increased accuracy.85 The advantage 
provided by superior optics is such that the U.S. Army continues to invest in this 
technology. At a 2016 defense conference, the U.S. Army expressed interest in an optic 
that could “digitally tag” a target such that an entire unit would be able to see and engage 
the tagged target.86 These advances in individual optics are amplified on crew served 
weapons and delivery platforms. Optics and sights on the Stryker and Bradley vehicles 
increase the range of small arms beyond 2000 meters.  
The night vision capability enjoyed by U.S. infantrymen allows Soldiers to 
identify objects and enemy during conditions of limited visibility thus changing the 
diurnal/nocturnal nature of conflict. The ability to see at night provides a mobility, 
protection, and lethality advantage.87 Infantrymen can move on foot or by vehicle 
without the use of light in the visible spectrum. This capability simultaneously increases 
protection by allowing Soldiers to identify enemy personnel or hazards without 
compromise. Additionally, night vision provides a unique control mechanism. The use of 
infrared strobes and lasers offers leaders the ability to identify friendly forces, indicate 
direction, and communicate maneuver limits. Finally, night vision allows concealment. 
Leaders can do map checks and medics can provide lifesaving care in darkness. 
However, the once significant advantage that propagated the U.S. military saying “We 
own the night” has eroded to a position of “we share the night” or “Maintain the night” 
due to the proliferation of night-vision technology to adversaries.88  
The use of night vision and optical enhancement technology demand additional 
training because the mobility, lethality, and protective advantages secured with their use 
are neither automatic nor lasting. To retain their advantage, Soldiers must train with 
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multiple optics and select the one best suited for the mission at hand. Additionally, 
Soldiers must certify with all of these aids to ensure they are capable of both identifying 
and accurately engaging an enemy with them. The increased training requirement 
inevitably causes something else to go untrained. Moreover, most optics and night-vision 
devices require a power source. The unpredictability of power generation in the field 
environment requires Soldiers to train mechanisms and methods that do not require 
batteries. In addition to the training required for the optics, laser, and night-vision 
devices, Soldiers retain qualification with iron sights, and control techniques that allow 
combat operations to continue when batteries die, especially in times of limited visibility. 
3. Personal Protective Equipment 
The technological balance between mobility, lethality, and protection affects 
personal protective equipment (PPE) just as it does vehicles and optical enhancements. 
On the one hand PPE alone increases Soldiers’ survivability during an explosion, enemy 
small arms engagement, and the falls necessary for Individual Movement Techniques 
while under fire.89 On the other hand, when in body armor, Soldiers are slower and their 
movements more cumbersome.90 Researchers from 2000 to the present contend that 
combat task performance degradations are from 30% to 60%.91 This means Soldiers 
climb walls and ladders and half the speed, low crawl at half the pace, and move half the 
distance in a given time period. While PPE are essential for saving Soldiers lives in 
combat, specifically, in countering the IED threat, leaders must understand that the 
associated degradation to mobility and lethality associated with body armor also presents 
a hazard to both the mission and the men.  
This performance hazard is first identified in training with body armor. 
Individuals must train in full PPE to know that there are inherent degradations to 
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performance associate with it. The ballistic eye protection that keeps fragmentation away 
from one’s eye will fog over preventing target identification. Fire retardant gloves limit 
dexterity; ear protection can force adjustments to an individual’s sight picture and his 
ability to accurately engage targets. This list is not inclusive of the many limitations 
induced by PPE, however, it serves to emphasize that only once individuals and leaders 
understand the degrading effects PPE has on performance, can they adequately prepare 
for these effects when presented with them in combat.  
C. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE TRAINING 
U.S. Army doctrine states that realistic training increases combat performance and 
reduces casualties; conversely, the opposite is just as true.92 The following obstacles to 
training decrease combat performance and increase the likelihood of casualties. First, 
company commanders must prepare their Infantry companies for the next war, but are not 
afforded the time to do so. Second, when the commanders are executing training, the 
existing regulations decrease the realism of the training such that the event poorly 
replicates the operational environment and minimizes the simulator fidelity achieved with 
the training. Last, the previously mentioned time constraints on tactical leaders force 
organizational complacency and a “this is how we’ve always done it” mentality. While 
the list of obstacles to effective training is significant, this section will analyze the 
aforementioned three—time and task saturation, restrictive training regulations, and 
organizational complacency—that appear to have the most negative impact on combat 
preparation.  
1. Time and Task Saturation—“The Deluge of Requirements” 
Infantry company commanders do not have the time to execute all of the directed 
training requirements to the prescribed standard. A 2002 study conducted by the Army 
War College concluded that company commanders “have to fit 297 days of mandatory 
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requirements into 256 available training days.”93 Moreover, a 2012 Inspector General 
(IG) report indicated that “At none (0 of 16) of the locations inspected were companies in 
the ARFORGEN process able to complete all mandatory training and administrative 
tasks.”94 Then in 2017, the Training Management Directorate at Fort Leavenworth 
published a document emphasizing the need for company commander’s to use web-based 
training aids and doctrine to “make unit training more efficient and more effective.”95 
While web-based resources may be helpful, the most significant problem with training is 
that company commanders do not have the time to execute training because of the 
additional tasks assigned. U.S. Army Armor Captain Scott Metz highlighted the effect of 
over tasking when he wrote, “U.S. Army tactical proficiency at company level and below 
is lower than many of our multinational partners due to a lack of emphasis on collective 
training and tactical proficiency at home station.”96 Captain Metz continued that 
company commanders do not have the time or training opportunity to train those METL-
related items.97 This task saturation when combined with the “we’ll get it done” military 
mentality, erodes the commander’s integrity, but more importantly, it prevents an 
Infantry company from supporting the military’s number one priority: combat readiness.  
At present, senior political and military leaders seem to understand that combat 
readiness as a priority was only receiving lip service. A recent memorandum from the 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis indicated that the “U.S. [is] unprepared for combat” 
and that military training needs to be overhauled so that service members can spend more 
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time “on the art and science of warfighting.”98 Secretary Mattis understands that military 
units will not be successful by simply declaring that readiness is the top priority. Infantry 
company commanders want to train; however, they need the time and opportunity, free 
from what Dr. Leonard Wong, a professor at the U.S. Army War College, calls “The 
Deluge of Requirements,” so that they can train their men for war.99 
2. Peacetime Control Mechanisms / Range Regulations 
Combat readiness is forged during realistic training, and done in accordance with 
predetermined METs. However, controls placed on units may degrade the realism in 
training and erode the simulator fidelity necessary for the combat readiness of the unit. 
The surface danger zones (SDZs) of small arms are intended to minimize fratricide 
within the friendly element. However, the restriction of existing SDZs prevents tactical 
units from executing fire and maneuver at the squad and platoon level. Department of the 
Army Pamphlet 385–36 states “For the [small arms] SDZ, there must be an angle of 15 
degrees or 100m (whichever is greater) between the limit of fire and the near flank of the 
closest individual or unit and all impact are beyond the individual or unit.”100 Restated, a 
supporting element must shift off their target or cease fire when the assaulting element is 
over a football field away.  
Even more alarming is the SDZ for Bangalore torpedoes SDZ in training: 
“Personnel will be in a missile-proof shelter 100m from the charge, or 200m away in 
defilade. For unprotected personnel in the open, the minimum safe distance (MSD) is 
1,000 m at right angles to axis of the Bangalore torpedo.”101 It is unrealistic to assume 
that a tactical leader would authorize sending a breaching element 200 meters forward of 
the supporting element, and no flank security within 1,000 meters. Further, it is ridiculous 
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to expect conveniently placed “missile-proof shelters” when breaching an enemy’s 
obstacle belt. The final example refers to the incorporation of indirect or aerial fires. 
When calling fires, the JFIRE manual implies that close-in fire missions may be executed 
in combat, but provides specific distances for “training use only.”102 In training a GBU-
38 500lb JDAM has a minimum safe distance of 1100m. In combat, this same bomb is 
authorized for a danger close drop of 185m, a difference of 1,015m.103 In contrast to the 
JFIRE manual, the Army Field Manual 3–21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company, which 
provides guidance and direction for an Infantry company in combat states, “[i]f required, 
the company commander can even call for artillery fires right on his company position 
using proximity or time fuses for airbursts.”104 This report does not suggest a need to call 
for fire on one’s position in training. However, it does highlight the self-induced disparity 
between the combat a training environment. While this is only one of many examples, the 
conflicting nature of doctrine highlights both the serious dangers of combat and the 
avoidance of risk in training. Moreover, the aforementioned examples are only a few 
where the standards in training differ from those in combat because of peacetime control 
mechanisms.  
3. Organizational Complacency—“This Is the Way We’ve Always Done it” 
The Mission Essential Task List determines the training necessary to prepare an 
Infantry company for its combat mission. However, a lack of task understanding and 
organizational complacency justify leaders and subordinates embracing the historic 
norms because that is how training was done before. At a minimum, this mentality leads 
to a standardized bureaucracy where the training proficiency of the company, as assessed 
by the commander, is irrelevant. The company will execute the same training cycle that 
was executed previously in a form of rinse and repeat. The result is a lack of innovation 
and a failure of mission analysis. Moreover, this organizational complacency serves to 
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reinforce and solidify bad habits. The enemy is always changing and adapting, therefore, 
it is incumbent upon leaders to engage in thorough and constant analysis of the enemy so 
that the training environment mimics the combat environment as closely as possible. In 
the same way, the rinse and repeat method of training ignores friendly weapon 
advancements and/or concerns to Soldier health and welfare. Advances in munition 
lethality change this safe distance for friendly personnel. Advances in parachute 
technology changed the time of freefall and the altitude at which paratroopers may safely 
exit the aircraft. Advances in night-vision technology increase Infantry maneuverability 
and simultaneously the effectiveness of combat medics in hours of limited visibility. A 
“this is how we’ve always done it” approach to training retards an Infantry company’s 
innovation and mission analysis while preventing an increase in its lethality and 
survivability. 
4. Conclusion—The Effect of Training Obstacles 
The effect of these training obstacles is a reduction in simulator fidelity and an 
increase in the likelihood of casualties during an Infantry unit’s first combat engagement. 
Individually and collectively, combat readiness suffers because of the lack of time 
provided to train combat tasks and the existing range regulations that misalign actions in 
training with the execution of these same actions in combat. Despite the demand to 
“Train as [we] fight,” leaders resort to a “this is how we’ve always done it” mentality, 
symptomatic of the organizational complacency that accompanies the “deluge of 
requirements.”105 Senior political and military leaders see the erosion of combat 
readiness and correctly attribute it to unrealistic number of directed training tasks a 
company must complete. However, without changes to existing regulations that 
undermine the realism of Mission Essential Task training, the organizational 
complacency that currently saturates the training environment will endure and combat 
readiness will continue to erode. 
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III. RISK MITIGATION, MISSION COMMAND, AND ERODING 
COMBAT READINESS 
U.S. Army infantrymen are expected to fight and win when the nation calls. 
Winning requires training in environments and scenarios that most closely resemble the 
future combat situation. To this point, does the U.S. Army Infantry, at the tactical level, 
train as they fight? Does the training environment provide the simulator fidelity necessary 
to create “pre-battle veterans” prior to commitment to a combat or contingency 
operation? This chapter will attempt to answer this question in three sections. First, an 
examination of U.S. Army risk management and safety doctrine will highlight how 
commanders identify hazards and assume risk. The second section will analyze the 
perception of hazards and the influence of perception on risk assumption. Finally, this 
chapter will conclude with a study of the application of the U.S. Army’s warfighting 
philosophy, mission command, and its current relevance in both training and combat. In 
the end, this chapter will suggest that the priority afforded to safety or risk mitigation, 
and the misalignment of mission command in the training environment enabled the 
certification and validation of unprepared units and a degradation in combat readiness.  
A. RISK AND SAFETY DOCTRINE 
Formal risk mitigation, as a matter of doctrine, is relatively new among the U.S. 
Army Infantry. However, an increased emphasis on safety in training started in 1958.106 
Three years following the establishment of the U.S. Army Aviation Center, in 1955 the 
death rate in aviation units spiked. The U.S. Army attributed these casualties to a lack of 
guidance on properly managing risk.107 This phenomenon led to the establishment of the 
U.S. Army Board for Aviation Accident Research (USABAAR), which ultimately 
resulted in Army Regulation 95–5 and Army Regulation 385–10, which detailed accident 
reporting procedures and the Army Safety Program.108 Until 1995, safety doctrine 
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progressively matured in the Army. High-accident probability became equated with high 
risk; leaders focused on the early detection of hazards rather than accident reporting; 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) implemented a “risk assessment 
worksheet” that reduced training accidents by 60%.109 However, the 1995 deaths of five 
students at the U.S. Army Ranger School caught the attention of the U.S. Congress, 
which required that the U.S. Army formalize risk management in doctrine. Field Manual 
100–14, Risk Management, published in 1998, was the U.S. Army’s answer to Congress.  
1. Risk Management Doctrine 
U.S. Army risk management and safety doctrine may be progressing toward a 
“zero-defect” training environment and a mentality that all loss is preventable. More 
importantly, if all loss is preventable then behind every accident is a culpable leader. Risk 
Management should be the process defined in joint doctrine, “the process of identifying, 
assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that 
balance risk cost with mission benefits.”110 While Risk Management in the training 
environment should be an enduring activity, the reality is that it lies somewhere between 
risk aversion and the aforementioned process.111 U.S. Army Lieutenant General (Ret.) 
David Barno and U.S. defense policy expert Nora Bensahel believe “the Army’s 
overweening approach to safety has created a widespread culture of near-total risk aversion 
when troops are not in combat.”112 While this report does not maintain that the U.S. Army 
Infantry is completely risk averse, it does suggest that the management of risk in training 
violates the doctrinal risk management process by deprioritizing mission benefits when 
calculating risk costs. 
The principles of Risk Management, stated in ATP 5–19 Risk Management, 
highlight the need to identify hazards and risks during all phases of a mission, to 
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decentralize the process so the appropriate commander is assessing mission risk, to avoid 
unnecessary risk, and to use feedback to improve risk mitigation.113 It is a cyclical process 
of risk assessment and risk management, as depicted in Figure 1. Leaders must identify and 
assess the hazards then manage those hazards with the development and implementation of 
controls and measures of effectiveness.114 Moreover, the assessment of the hazards 
involves some prediction as to the likelihood and severity of the risk associated with them. 
Thus, an identified hazard is higher risk if it has a higher probability of occurrence and 
higher severity in terms of the consequences.115 This determines the overall risk level. 
 
Figure 1.  The Cycle of Risk Management in U.S. Army Doctrine116 
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Risk level is assessed on a scale from Low to Extremely High, and determines the 
level of authority required to assume risk.117 Commanders determine risk tolerance, “the 
level of risk the responsible commander is willing to accept.”118 To assume risk, a 
commander must have the authority and resources to implement the controls necessary to 
mitigate the risk. In keeping with the concept of mission command, the intent of the 
aforementioned process is to provide the appropriate command level with both the 
authority and the resources to identify and mitigate risk.119 In training, the installation 
commander is responsible for all risk on the installation. Understanding that one 
individual cannot oversee every training event, accepted safety standards allow 
delegation to subordinate commanders based on the level of risk and the duration of the 
training event. An Infantry company commander may assume the risk for an event 
deemed low risk and lasting less than one month.120 Risk management doctrine provides 
a framework for commanders to identify hazards, determine risk, and then delegate risk 
assumption authority to an authority that can ensure the implementation of controls 
without detracting from the training value.  
2. Safety Doctrine and Regulation 
While Risk Management doctrine is designed to mitigate risk to the mission, the 
Soldiers and to equipment, Army Safety doctrine is forcused on loss of people and 
equipment. Safety doctrine takes a comprehensive approach to safety, encompassing all 
activities of the service member both on and off duty.121 Further, safety doctrine specifies 
that the risk management process cannot justify disregarding laws, policies, and 
regulations.122 The inflexibility of this doctrine is such that any deviation to regulation 
requires approval from garrison and mission safety offices, a legal review, and an 
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environmental and public affairs office review prior to consideration from the appropriate 
authority.123 The mandate to prevent loss within the U.S. Army permeated the culture 
such that company grade officers are often held to “impossible standards in a misguided, 
centralized attempt to limit every imaginable accident or error.”124 Consequently, U.S. 
Army safety messages now advise Soldiers on the hazards of “crossing streets while 
playing Pokémon Go.”125 Despite, the philosophy of mission command, and a need to 
delegate risk management to the appropriate authority, the U.S. Army fails to do so in 
training. Instead, it remains a centrally controlled bureaucracy that undermines its own 
warfighting philosophy.126  
B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK PERCEPTION 
Paradoxically, the U.S. Army has adopted a warfighting philosophy that 
advocates the empowerment of junior leaders, but concurrently espouses a doctrine that 
erodes initiative and discourages judgement. To understand this dichotomy, it is 
imperative to consider some of those factors that affect the perception of risk. Loss 
aversion, vulnerability, and emotion are three influences that affect how decision makers 
view hazards and how they associate risk with them. These factors, individually and 
cumulatively result in the application of the “precautionary principle,” commonly 
associated with the saying “better to err on the side of caution.”127 The first influence, 
loss aversion, suggests that loss and feelings of disadvantage have a more significant 
effect on one’s preference than does the feeling of gain or advantage.128 Next, the 
perception of vulnerability and the paradox of risk mitigation suggest that as people 
become safer, they become more concerned about risk and they feel more vulnerable to 
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it.129 Last, the emotional and rational aspects of risk assumption can lead to a 
misalignment between the perception of risk and the reality of it.130 The effect of 
psychology on risk perception provides some possible explanation for the emphasis on 
and centrality of U.S. Army Safety doctrine. 
Loss aversion asserts that preference is based on a frame of reference rather than 
real empirical data.131 Therefore, the language used to communicate in U.S. Army 
doctrine and regulation provides the reference upon which the loss aversion is instilled. 
Figure 2, which shows Table 3–2 from DA PAM 385–30 Risk Management, displays 
how the U.S. Army determines severity in the evaluation of hazards. The severity is 
measured in terms of what is lost. A catastrophic event is one where one or more lives are 
lost. Conversely, in an Infantry company of 150 Soldiers, an event where 149 Soldiers’ 
lives are retained communicates the same data, but not in terms of loss.  
 
Figure 2.  Risk Management Severity Categories Communicate Loss132 
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According to psychologists, people feel the pain of loss at two times the 
magnitude of the happiness felt of a similar gain. Thus, the desire to avoid an amount of 
loss is greater than the desire to achieve the same amount of gain.133 This asymmetry 
between feelings of loss and gain manifest themselves in risk mitigation procedures and 
safety doctrine. Because of this psychological phenomenon, leaders will perceive and 
quantify risk as greater than it actually is because doctrine and the units of measurement 
reference hazards and risk in terms of loss. 
Another reason people misperceive risk is the paradox of risk mitigation: as one 
becomes safer, one becomes more concerned about risk and one’s vulnerability to it. U.S. 
Soldiers are safer today, in both training and combat, than at any other point in military 
history. A 2016 assessment of the Army Safety Program concluded that the U.S. Army’s 
safety culture continued a decade-long record of reducing injuries, fatalities, and loss of 
equipment.134 The advances in personal protective equipment and combat medical care, 
specifically in the first hour following injury, “The Golden Hour,” saved lives that would 
have been lost in previous wars. Casualties in the Korean War totaled 36,000 killed in 
action (KIA) and 103,000 wounded in action (WIA).135 In the Vietnam War, casualty 
estimates were 58,000 KIA and 153,000 WIA.136 As of 2015, casualties in the wars of 
Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 6,800 and the wounding of 52,000 
Soldiers, a significant decrease in numbers, especially considering the length of these 
conflicts.137 This trend in decreasing combat casualties is reflected in training accidents 
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and casualties as well.138 Without question, the current U.S. Army is the safest army is 
U.S. history. It follows that this increase in safety is paired with an increase in perceived 
vulnerability. As stated, safety doctrine progressed from accident reporting in the 1960s 
to the present form where Soldiers receive orders on how to cross streets, where 
reflective belts are mandatory, and where commanders split their focus between off-duty 
incidents and preparation for combat (this final point will be discussed in depth in a 
follow-on section). The safety culture in the current U.S. Army is a product of a “better to 
err on the side of caution” mentality, but called risk mitigation when it is not. 
Cognitive and perceptual biases compound the paradox of risk mitigation, and 
continually influence decision-making. Once an activity is perceived or labeled as unsafe, 
gradual changes the decrease the risk and make the activity safer go unnoticed.139 
Moreover, initial impressions, even when incorrect, persist because “the amount of 
information necessary to invalidate a perception is considerably greater than the amount 
of information required to form an initial impression” in the first place.140 This explains 
why advances in the accuracy of rifles, the precision of optics, the progression of night 
vision, and the improvement of body armor have not resulted in decreased sensitivity to 
surface danger zones and minimum safe distances in the training environment. On the 
contrary, the surface danger zones of explosives and small arms either remained 
unchanged or increased such that friendly force maneuver is more restricted than it was 
before such advancements. While these surface danger zones exist as a centralized form 
of risk mitigation, they demonstrate the paradox of risk mitigation when considered with 
the aforementioned biases.  
Risk mitigation is both rational and emotional, and therefore, the element of 
emotion is another risk perception factor often manipulated by bias. Generally, people 
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consider flying a greater risk than driving a car, despite all statistics indicating that 
driving a car is a much riskier endeavor.141 The estimation of probabilities, the evaluation 
of evidence, and the attribution of causality are factors often reinforced and/or 
manipulated by biases.142 Catastrophic plane crashes are easier to recall than car crashes; 
therefore, they seem more likely to occur. Additionally, human beings have a natural 
tendency toward consistency and the assumption that because something happened 
before, it is likely to happen again.143 The rational and objective aspect of estimating 
probability and evaluating facts is manipulated by these cognitive and perceptual biases 
such that perceived risk is inflated. 
Military Range Safety Officials also fall victim to the effect of the aforementioned 
biases. The apprehension associated with fratricide and unintended demolitions effects is 
unfounded when considering recent safety statistics, yet this anxiety manipulates the 
alignment of risk and risk perception. Injuries sustained during sports and physical 
training far outnumber the injuries sustained during combat training and preparation.144 
Moreover, almost all fatalities in training are aviation or vehicle related when compared 
to fatalities due to maneuver or demolitions fratricide.145 While Range Control officials 
argue with company commanders over the risk of a training event, the reality is that the 
unit is more likely to sustain injuries during morning PT or while driving to the training 
event, rather than during the training event itself. Although the severity associated with 
military training casualties, when endured, exceeds that of morning PT, the likelihood of 
such injuries is misrepresented and exaggerated because they are easy to imagine and 
thus seem more likely to occur. 
The manifestations of vulnerability, loss aversion, and perceptual bias are not 
confined to casualties in training; rather, they permeate the psychology of decision 
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makers and determine what is considered safe. In a message to the Army, the Director of 
Army Safety and Commanding General stated that, “Accidents are preventable losses” 
and that “Loss prevention begins with engaged leaders and the safety culture.”146 
Statements such as this reinforce the misalignment between risk and risk perception. 
When risk is referenced and evaluated in terms of loss, decision makers fall victim to loss 
aversion and tend to evaluate the risk at almost twice its realistic level. The Sergeant 
Major of the Army reinforced this when he said, “most fatal accidents, within the U.S. 
Army, occur when the Service Member is off-duty.”147 This results in a belief that the 
most dangerous thing a leader can do is release Soldiers from duty for the day or 
weekend. In practice, the acceptance that accidents are preventable, and leaders are 
responsible for “everything their unit does or fails to do” enabled the belief that an off-
duty accident is a leadership failure.148 Notions like these negate the monumental strides 
already taken to instill the mission command philosophy. Moreover, holding leaders 
accountable for events over which they have no control, justifies the centralizing of 
authority in order to prevent accidents. The need to avoid accidents and loss catalyzes 
biases that distort pragmatic and calculated risk mitigation measures and encourage 
leaders to “err on the side of caution” when the perceived risk is unfounded and inflated. 
The resulting misalignment between risk perception and risk manifests itself as an 
incompatibility between the training environment and the combat environment.  
C. MISSION COMMAND AND RISK IN THE COMBAT ENVIRONMENT 
The senior leadership of the U.S. Army understands that the combat environment 
is both dangerous and risky. ADRP 6–0 Mission Command and ATP 5–19 Risk 
Management dictate the necessity to “enable discipline initiative,” “empower…leaders,” 
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and “accept prudent risk.”149 Born out of the German concept of Auftragstaktik, 
translated to mean mission-type orders and tactics, mission command delegates the 
responsibility to calculate risk, assume risk, and act down to the appropriate authority.150 
Company commanders are both empowered and expected to act when the situation 
demands it. Moreover, the responsibility to take initiative is not confined to those with 
command authority; all leaders are expected to take disciplined initiative in support of a 
higher mission. This decentralization of authority requires both the communication of a 
higher mission and the empowerment of the appropriate subordinate authority. Using 
mission orders and dialogue, commanders communicate the Who, What, When, Where, 
How, the purpose, and the endstate expected for operations.151 This knowledge allows 
subordinate leaders to conduct their own mission analysis, perform their own enemy 
analysis, and devise a course of action that meets their higher commander’s intent. 
Moreover, because this course of action was devised and not dictated, both buy-in and 
mission understanding increase.  
Taking disciplined initiative also requires delegation of command authority. 
Orders must be enforceable, and if lower level leaders are going to issue orders then they 
need the ability to enforce those orders. According to U.S. doctrine, the Ground Force 
Commander (GFC) is responsible for the completion of the mission and the protection of 
the force.152 Military rank does not trump command authority in combat. Senior 
Lieutenants and junior Captains will issue orders to senior ranking personnel expecting 
that those orders are followed. This authority is restricted to the confines of the mission at 
hand; however, it is a necessity for mission success. In combat, the GFCs are responsible 
for enforcing necessary safety procedures and adhering to established standard operating 
procedures so long as they support mission success and mitigate the risk to the force as 
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best as possible. In combat, the priority is always the mission; the protection of the men 
comes second, followed by the protection of one’s self. This is the nature of command 
and it is essential to leadership in the U.S. Army Infantry. Junior officers, when acting as 
GFCs, are charged and trusted to lead and weigh risk against mission benefits, then to act 
decisively using their best judgement.  
1. Training Misalignment with Mission Command 
In spite of the U.S. Army’s warfighting philosophy, the responsibility of the GFC 
in the training environment and in not consistent with the U.S. Army’s concept of 
mission command. During a collective live fire exercise, the senior lieutenant or junior 
captain is often in the shadow of the battalion operations officer or battalion commander. 
Observer-controllers stand behind or adjacent to every maneuver element and crew-
served weapon system, evaluating them, ensuring they are safe, and often telling the 
Soldiers what targets to engage and when to do so. Moreover, the iteration designed to 
mimic combat and certify the unit for combat, the night time—live fire iteration, is the 
sixth repetition for that unit. Centralizing the execution of an exercise, then repeating the 
same exercise six times in row prevents the subordinate freedom of action and initiative 
that are essential to the mission orders and tactics philosophy.  
This strict and centralized management of training exercises does not support 
mission command, and actually undermines the concept. Leaders do not learn to analyze 
a mission and work through a tactical problem if the exercise scenario dictates a course of 
action. Squad Leaders and Team Leaders do not practice disciplined initiative in moving, 
emplacing, or reacting. In reality, initiative is discouraged because the location from 
which an individual can employ a weapon system is predetermined and often overtly 
marked with flags or engineer tape. More importantly, this system of training degrades 
the trust and confidence of the Soldiers and leaders. The Soldiers see “that they’re 
considered bumbling incompetents and that their leaders are considered worse.”153 While 
mission command promotes decentralization to appropriate authorities and empowering 
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disciplined initiative, the current training practices undermine this philosophy by 
adhering to a safety first, mission second mentality.  
In training, the range officer in charge (Range OIC) and the range safety officer 
(RSO) are responsible for safety during training. They perform the risk management 
process and submit their recommendation through a bureaucratic system based on 
rank.154 Furthermore, the approval of target placement, munitions used, and maneuver 
limitations is delegated to an agency outside the chain of command - Range Control.155  
Range Control is the installation commander’s representative, charged to manage 
the installation’s range facilities and enforce existing safety doctrine.156 However, the 
enforcement of safety doctrine takes precedence over the employment of risk 
management.157 This last point creates significant friction because safety is an individual, 
collective, and shared obligation. In an Infantry company, ensuring safety and 
determining “the acceptable level of risk” is a commander’s responsibility.158 
Nevertheless, the abdication of range safety authority to Range Control allows range 
controls’ interpretation of safety doctrine to trump realism in training, when the two are 
in conflict. This is another violation of mission command and an erosion of the trust this 
philosophy demands.  
The debate surrounding the prioritization of safety over mission requirements is 
old one and remains unresolved. The Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus in Annals said, 
“The desire for safety stands against every great and noble enterprise.”159 U.S. Civil 
War-era General William Tecumseh Sherman stated, “Every attempt to make war easy 
and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.”160 However, the existing counter-
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argument maintains that a system void of safe practices that results in death, “gnaw[s] at 
the confidence, morale, and operational capabilities of the force.”161 The number of non-
battle injuries during combat campaigns is well documented, as is the effect on the force. 
Further, as of 2017, service members were more likely to die in “peacetime” incidents 
than in active hostilities or combat.162 While this might be true in the year 2017, it was 
neither true during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, nor during the surges of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Moreover, if Major General William C. Hix, the current Army G3, is 
correct, this statement will not be accurate in the next war American infantrymen fight. 
Second, while non-battle casualties outnumber combat casualties, the current service 
chiefs do not blame unsafe training practices. As previously mentioned, Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis, General Mark Milley, the Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral John 
Richardson, the Chief of Naval Operations, have all cited a degradation in readiness as 
responsible for the increase in non-battle injuries and fatalities.163 While safety in 
training is important, perhaps the most effective measure leaders can take is to improve 
the quality and realism of their training.  
2. A Degradation in Readiness through the Lens of Live Fire Surface 
Danger Zones (SDZs) 
This degradation in readiness at the Infantry company level due lack of simulator 
fidelity in training is not a new phenomenon, but the result an abdication of training 
authority to agencies outside the chain of command. When examining only the U.S. Army 
Infantry during live fire training exercises, it is evident that changes to regulations resulted 
in a prioritization of safety over the mission. The original purpose of range regulations was 
to reduce the chance of accidents without sacrificing realism or impeding the authority of 
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unit leaders.164 As an example, Surface Danger Zones (SDZs) were first developed in 1942 
when troops trained to engage low flying aircraft by firing into the air. The result was 
fratricide incidents kilometers away when the rounds returned to the surface.165 However, 
the SDZ concept transitioned to centralized safety mechanism applied to every weapon, 
laser, ammunition, and demolition.166 While it is essential to avoid fratricide, it is important 
to remember that the responsibility to avoid fratricide within one unit remained that of the 
“responsible commander.”167 Moreover, this first installment of range regulation specified 
that the purpose was to “minimize the possibility of accidents,” that “Training restrictions 
produced by precautionary measures will be kept to the minimum consistent with reasonable 
and practical safety,” and that “Troops who are advanced in training and are engaged in 
combat firing exercises…may fire with less restrictive measures.”168 Since the genesis of 
the SDZ, the restrictions in safety doctrine discount the training assessment of the 
commander preferring to err on the side of caution.  
Fortunately, many leaders within the U.S. Army Infantry community understand 
that encroaching safety regulations undermine realism in training. Over three decades 
ago, in 1985, an Infantry company commander wrote in Infantry Magazine that common 
sense and the chain of command were the “victim[s]” of safety.169 In 2016, General 
Robert B. Abrams, the commander of Forces Command, reiterated the necessity to train 
under realistic conditions when he stated, “Unnecessary or outdated range control 
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measures that inhibit realism will be eliminated.”170 While the identification of 
encroaching safety regulation is important, it is merely the symptom of a greater problem.  
Even more concerning than encroaching safety regulation is the loss of command 
authority to the safety regulation. SDZs are not the reason readiness has degraded; rather, 
they are a symptom of the problem and one indicator of how an entity like Range Control 
usurped command authority in the Risk Management process.  
 
Figure 3.  Expanding Small Arms Surface Danger Zones from 1942 to 2012171  
Figure 3 shows the changes in small arms SDZs from 1942 to the present.172 In 
1942, the SDZ was five degrees to account for dispersion and ricochet.173 By 2003, the 
SDZ was distance specific, but in practice fifteen degrees was accepted and taught at the 
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Infantry basic courses.174 By 2012, the “Batwing” SDZ superseded the “cone” SDZ further 
removing flanking units from the Gun Target Line and reducing realism.175 The U.S. Army 
converted to the smaller caliber in round in the 1950s and 1960s because of increased 
accuracy and performance.176 While the U.S. Army adopted an enhanced 5.56mm round in 
2010, the U.S. Army still trains with the “green tip” 5.56mm round of the 1960s.177 The 
weapons employed since the Vietnam War have optics and more advanced componentry 
increasing the accuracy of the 5.56mm round when fired. Further, the reports on the 
enhanced 5.56 round suggest, “there is no question that this round has increased accuracy at 
greater distances.”178 Despite repeated increases in accuracy, the SDZ associated with U.S. 
Army small arms progressively increased suggesting that risk perception, not risk itself, is 
the cause.  
The negative effect of increased safety restrictions, despite decreased risk, 
manifests itself in the execution of Battle drills. These small-unit drills, detailed in The 
Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, provide the foundation for the U.S. Army Infantry’s 
tactical lethality at the start of combat engagement.179 Following a reaction to enemy 
contact, the element in contact establishes a base of fire while the element not in contact 
prepares to execute a flanking maneuver as part of an attack, or to knock out a bunker or 
bunker complex. In 1942, the base of fire element suppressing an enemy target 200 meters 
away could support the flanking element until it was within 18 meters of the target.180 In 
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2003, using the 15-degree cone SDZ, that distance grew to 53.6 meters.181 By 2012, the 
employment of the batwing SDZ further increased that distance to 163.1 meters from the 
target.182 Moreover, if the unit was using the enhanced ammunition, which is being 
employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the SDZ increases to 65 degrees, which made 
flanking movements impractical or impossible with existing SDZ restrictions.183 The 
small arms SDZ increases are one example of how encroaching safety regulations inhibit 
realistic training and contribute to the degradation in combat readiness. 
These expanding training restrictions are not limited to small arms but include the 
use of all Infantry weapons in the training environment. When employing fragmentation 
grenades, Department of the Army Pamphlet 385–63 specifies that “Every precaution 
will be taken to prevent injury from blast, concussion, and fragment. For training 
purposes, fragmentation and offensive hand grenades will be thrown from a trench or 
barrier equivalent to a screen of sandbags 0.5 m (1.65 ft) thick.”184 The regulation 
continues that the “Impact area will be free of obstacles,” that a “minimum side-to-side 
distance of 5m between individual[s]…is required,” and that “EOD personnel will 
destroy dud grenades in place or safe and remove before troops enter the grenade impact 
area.”185 While constructing a live fire training event that included the use of live hand 
grenades, an Infantry platoon leader was informed that he would have to create a “putting 
green” within five meters of the bunker and that Soldiers would have to “place, not 
throw, toss, or drop, the grenade in a grenade sump inside the bunker.”186 While it makes 
perfect sense to protect friendly troops from the blast of a hand grenade, the 
aforementioned constraints are only the beginning of restrictions on hand grenade use 
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such that units either choose not to implement this aspect of training, or endure such 
restrictions despite the façade of realism. Senior leaders within the Army and the Military 
Service Chiefs are concerned about combat readiness and unrealistic training. At the 
tactical level, increased safety restrictions that do not mirror the risk hinder realistic 
training. More importantly, commanders do not have the authority to challenge these 
restrictions because their authority is abdicated to the installation. This is violation of the 
U.S. Army’s war fighting philosophy and contributes to both the lack of realism in 
training and the decrease in readiness.  
3. Lack of Preparation— “Training Scar Tissue” 
The differences between the training environment and the combat environment 
create the potential for a lack of preparation and bad habits that decrease performance in 
combat. The lack of preparation presents when leaders excise new authorities they are 
unfamiliar with, when maneuver procedures or standards change, or when Soldiers 
misunderstand the effects of their weapon systems. Bad habits, learned in the training 
environment, transfer to the combat environment because they are what the Soldier 
knows. Grossman refers to this reality as “Training Scars.”187 Police Officers that fire 
two rounds at a target in training, then stop to pick up the bullet casing do this same thing 
when engaging criminal in life threatening situations.188 Soldiers that run out of ammo 
during live fire exercises and yell, “bang, bang” are likely to do the same in combat.189 
This happens because “whatever is drilled in during training comes out the other end in 
combat.”190 Thus, it is certainly possible that Infantry company commanders will avoid 
maneuver because of existing SDZ restrictions in training. Additionally, it is possible that 
Soldiers will place grenades instead of throwing them, and units will lose the initiative 
because action stops when a round DUDs. Worst yet, it is possible that leaders’ 
confidence in their own decision making will falter because they are now operating with 
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authorities not provided in the training environment and without the suffocating oversight 
provided during their combat certification.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Infantry training environment must provide infantrymen the ability to 
understand and master all aspects of their environment if they are going to succeed in 
combat. As previously stated, men will not die for a line of text or a PowerPoint slide. 
Moreover, training men for combat using a PowerPoint will not work either. Soldiers 
must train for combat by replicating the physical, emotional, and psychological 
conditions of combat; “you train them on field of battle, getting them as close to the real 
thing as you can.’”191 Since the genesis of U.S. Army range regulation the restrictions 
imposed by safety regulations are frequently a proposed explanation for a for a unit’s lack 
of training proficiency. At present, the U.S. Army swamped itself “with more regulations 
and bureaucratic processes than any other military service.”192 Readiness within 
warfighting units is suffering, largely because of the previously mentioned “Deluge of 
Requirements” and centralized constraints that prevent realistic training and combat 
preparation. However, the U.S. Army warfighting doctrine changed to embrace mission 
command and an expectation for disciplined initiative.193 The training doctrine must 
follow. Despite the reality that that Risk Management doctrine is vague, senior 
commanders, doctrine, and regulation should under-write the prudent and calculated risk-
taking by their subordinates in training. Risk management and safety doctrine should not 
be an excuse or directive for leaders to avoid risk and abdicate the authority to assume 
risk to an agency outside the immediate chain of command. The U.S. Army must 
empower the appropriate commander with both the responsibility and authority to 
calculate and mitigate risk to his unit. 
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IV. HISTORICAL CASES OF TACTICAL U.S. ARMY INFANTRY 
UNITS IN HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT 
Any study of Infantry training, combat preparation, leadership, and risk requires 
an examination of U.S. Army Infantry units’ performance in combat. This chapter 
examines three tactical U.S. Army Infantry organizations in their first combat 
engagements in an attempt to understand if the training conducted prepared or hindered 
the force in combat. In general, these cases are examples of tactical infantry formations 
performing in high tempo conflict environments, similar to the conditions expected in 
America’s next conventional war. More specifically, the selection of these three cases 
highlight the factors of leadership, training, and technology as they relate to U.S. Army 
Infantry units’ preparation for their “First Battles.”194 First, Task Force Smith and the 
34th Infantry Regiment spearheaded the American effort during the Korean War. Their 
defeat later served as a rallying cry for combat readiness with the slogan “No More Task 
Force Smiths.”195 Second, a study of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry during some of fiercest 
conventional fighting in the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam highlights how a technological 
advantage is multiplied when combined with leadership and realistic training. Last, the 
participation of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Operation JUST CAUSE, specifically, the 
seizure of Rio Hato Airfield, illuminates one of the first engagements of the U.S. invasion 
of Panama. Furthermore, the actions of the Rangers during this battle demonstrate how 
realistic training can produce the simulator fidelity necessary to create “Pre-Battle 
Veterans.” Collectively, a temporal view of these cases shows the progression of the U.S. 
Army Infantry combat preparation, as well as the necessity for empowered leadership.  
Each of these historical narratives is analyzed using three criteria—leadership, 
training, and technology. First, leadership is evaluated using the U.S. Army’s leadership 
competencies and attributes to examine whether tactical leaders provided the requisite 
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“purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission.”196 Next, the evaluation 
of training studies the combat preparation of the unit and assesses whether or not the 
preparation was adequate. Finally, the analysis of technology examines the advantages 
and disadvantages provided to both belligerents of the conflict. In each case, the reader is 
reminded of the tragic costs endured by the unprepared and the risk averse. More 
importantly, these historical examples demonstrate how strong leadership provides the 
cornerstone for combat preparation, often determining victory or defeat before the battle 
takes place.  
A. 1-21 INFANTRY (TASK FORCE SMITH) AT THE START OF THE 
KOREAN WAR 
On July 5, 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. “Brad” Smith led 1st Battalion, 
21st Infantry into the first American ground combat engagement of the Korean War, and 
its first defeat.197 His task force, comprised of two infantry companies, an artillery 
section, a mortar platoon, and two 75mm recoilless rifle teams, was the spearhead of the 
24th Infantry Division.198 His mission was to reassure the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
forces, provide moral support, and delay the North Korean armored assault.199 Shortly 
after making contact with the North Korean Army, however, his task force was 
enveloped and overrun. Over the next 16 days, the 24th Infantry Division would endure 
3,600 casualties, including the division commander, three regimental commanders, and 
five battalion commanders in addition to an astonishing amount of military equipment.200 
Since this engagement, “No More Task Force Smiths” has been a rallying cry for combat 
readiness throughout the military.201 What factors resulted in the destruction of so many 
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American lives and loss of so much military equipment? It is incorrect to suggest that 
Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division failed because they lacked bravery. 
Instead, an examination of the tactical leadership, the training environment in post-WWII 
Japan, and the employment of military technology suggests that the synergistic failure in 
all three of the aforementioned categories led to both the failure of Task Force Smith’s 
mission and the loss of American lives.  
1. Leadership 
As the commander of Task Force Smith, LTC Smith failed to provide the 
necessary purpose, direction, and motivation required to reinforce the ROK units and 
delay the North Korean assault, despite his significant combat experience.202 
Furthermore, his task force was the product of a deteriorating command that was 
anything but combat ready. The men of Task Force Smith and the entire 24th division 
lacked purpose for the following reasons. First of all, they enjoyed the ease of the 
occupation mission. The U.S. Army in Japan was “a nine-to-four organization” that “led 
comfortable lives.”203 Additionally, most of the junior enlisted were young men “lured in 
the Army by the generous GI Bill.”204 Regardless of rank, the Soldiers of Far East 
commanded viewed the transition from an occupation army as “the end of the good 
life.”205 Purpose is what “gives subordinates the reason to achieve a desired outcome.”206 
Until 1949, the desired outcome was an early work day and a paycheck when it should 
have been the perfection of tasks and drills, understanding of the enemy, and 
development of junior leaders. Unfortunately, by the time Task Force Smith began 
training, combat in Korea was only months away.  
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The combat readiness miscarriage became apparent when LTC Smith received a 
mission that lacked any direction and failed to provide the motivation necessary to 
accomplish it. He was directed to “support the ROKs and give them moral support.”207 
His commander continued, “All we need is some men up there who won’t run when they 
see tanks.”208 Providing direction entails dialoguing with subordinate leaders so they 
understand the tasks and responsibilities necessary to accomplish their mission.209 The 
composition of the enemy force, their disposition on the battlefield, and capabilities 
employed the enemy are crucial elements to understanding one’s task. Further, LTC 
Smith should have received a location for where he could link-up with ROK forces, and 
names of key ROK leaders he could engage. This lack of direction was compounded by 
the absence of motivation. Instilling motivation entails “supplying the will and initiative 
to do what’s necessary.”210 While motivation is often associated with an individual’s 
internal drive, it is the leader’s responsibility to understand his Soldiers and provide them 
inspiration such that their internal drive aligns with the goals of the mission. Lacking 
motivation aligned with task and proper direction, LTC Smith moved his force north of 
the retreating ROK forces and established a battalion defense. This resulted in an 
overestimation of friendly capabilities and an underestimation of the North Korean Army. 
Upon contact with the enemy, Task Force Smith was outnumbered six to one, a gross 
violation of the three to one ratio advised for a U.S. Army unit in the defense, and vastly 
outgunned by the advancing North Korean infantry and armor. While LTC Smith was the 
recipient of poor direction, it was his duty to retrieve the information necessary so that he 
could then provide the requisite direction to his subordinate leaders and align the 
motivations of his men with the task at hand.  
While LTC Smith was both the receiver and provider of poor leadership, it is 
important to understand that his leadership presence in the face of an overwhelming 
enemy inspired the men of Task Force Smith, whereas other battalions in the division did 
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not share the same confidence in their commanding officers. Despite being overrun by 
more than 30 tanks and facing a 5,000-man North Korean infantry assault, the men of 
Task Force Smith did not run. Instead they looked to LTC Smith and waited for his order 
to attack, a testament to the LTC Smith’s leadership presence.211 The Army defines 
leader presence as “the impression a leader makes on others” and evaluates it based on 
the response of the Soldiers to a leader’s directive.212 In other battalions, infantry 
companies failed build the requisite volume of fire necessary to defend their positions 
and Soldiers were “withdrawing for no apparent reason.”213 These battalions abandoned 
their defenses and significant amounts of equipment and ammunition, sometimes prior to 
the arrival of the North Korean advance.214 The initial grit of Task Force Smith, when 
compared to that of the other two battalions, demonstrates how effective leader presence 
can provide the inspiration that ultimately aligns Soldiers’ motivations with the goals of 
the mission.  
Despite effective leader presence during initial contact with the North Korean 
Army, the lack of purpose provided in training and the failure to receive and provide 
direction in combat made success impossible for Task Force Smith. These men were 
psychologically unprepared because of the conditions tolerated as an occupation force. 
Commanders are responsible for all their unit does or fails to do, and LTC Smith, the 
commander of Task Force Smith, failed to provide the essential elements of leadership 
when he led his men into combat unprepared. 
2. Training 
The continued examination of Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division 
suggests that the training conducted failed to simulate the conditions in combat, resulting 
in a lack of simulator fidelity. Before 1949, infantry training in Japan consisted of 
individual and squad level exercises. Additionally, infantry units avoided training with 
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tanks and supporting artillery because of space restrictions.215 After 1949, when General 
Douglas MacArthur, the Far East Command (FEC) Commander, made training his 
number one priority, Infantry units still did not execute combat focused training for a 
number of reasons.216 First, existing ammunition shortages prevented units from firing 
recoilless rifles or mortar systems. Instead, training on these key weapon systems 
consisted of “crew drills and dry fire exercises.”217 Second, collective training exercises 
for regimental or larger units were unsupported because of space restrictions and the time 
required to build proficiency at lower command levels.218 Last, and most importantly, the 
social climate following World War II was wrought with a “bring the boys home” 
mentality and a false sense of security provided by the atomic bomb, such that many 
Soldiers believed the days of ground combat were over.219 The synergistic effect of the 
lack of training resources, the failure to motivate Soldiers resulted in unrealistic training 
exercises that “checked the block” rather than providing Soldiers with the simulator 
fidelity necessary for success in combat. As a result, Soldiers were lightly armed and did 
not understand weapons effects. Furthermore, tactical leaders were unfamiliar with fires 
integration, and battalions were uncertified on their METL tasks when U.S. policymakers 
needed combat ready Soldiers and units in Korea. 
In addition to unrealistic training exercises, the leaders of the 24th Infantry 
Division failed to evaluate the risk assumed by neglecting realistic training which 
resulted in a failure of risk mitigation. The resulting misalignment between the reality of 
the risk and the perception of it caused unsustainable casualties and mission failure. One 
example was the failure to adequately train an anti-armor capability. The resulting 
hazards associated with this gap should have illuminated the operational disadvantage 
produced when the enemy maintains an armor capability. On the contrary, the 
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misunderstanding of weapons effects produced by poor training resulted in unawareness 
of the risk to the force and to the mission. Identification of the hazard could have resulted 
in effective risk mitigation measures such as air support, combined execution with South 
Korean anti-armor units, or seeding the roads with anti-tank mines in advance of North 
Korean armored columns. Unfortunately, the failure to analyze the risk and properly 
mitigate it resulted in an inexcusable rout of American forces. The leaders that committed 
Soldiers to this conflict were aware of the North Korean armor assets and they were 
aware that their own training program failed to properly emphasize an anti-tank 
capability. Sadly, both leaders and Soldiers simply believed that their weapons could stop 
a tank, without validating the concept in the training environment. A modicum of risk 
analysis should have highlighted the risk assumption and galvanized mitigation measures.  
The leaders and Soldiers of Task Force Smith did not expect to go to war. The 
conditions of occupation and the belief that ground combat was over resulted in a training 
program that appeased superiors, but did not train the Soldiers to win. The training 
conducted provided minimal simulator fidelity and the unawareness of the risks 
associated with the lack of training resulted in Soldiers that were unprepared physically, 
emotionally, and psychologically for the combat in Korea.220 
3. Technology 
The lack of Task Force Smith’s preparation for combat was also evident in the 
deficient technology employed by the Soldiers during the first combat engagements of 
the war, most notably, the lack of an anti-tank capability. The U.S. Army possessed 
effective anti-tank weapons, but they were prioritized for the European Theater and were 
unavailable in Korea.221 As a result, Soldiers’ used the same equipment provided during 
World War II’s Pacific War. It was outdated and poorly maintained.222 Working batteries 
for radios were almost non-existent. The 75mm recoilless rifle and the 2.36-inch rocket 
launcher were incapable of penetrating the Soviet tanks employed by the North Koreans. 
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While High Explosive Antitank (HEAT) artillery shells existed, only 13 were accounted 
for.223 The HEAT artillery was the only operational anti-tank capability available to Task 
Force Smith; however, the ammunition allocation was grossly insufficient to be effective. 
Of note, the U.S. Air Force maintained an anti-tank capability, but because of a fratricide 
incident a few days prior to the deployment of Task Force Smith, supporting aircraft 
remained well north of LTC Smith’s position and unable to support ground combat.224 
This lack of an antitank capability, compounded by the degraded communications, 
created a technological imbalance that American Infantry forces could not, initially, 
overcome. As a result, North Korean forces successively enveloped and overran 
American blocking positions. 
4. Conclusion  
Regrettably, the men of Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division were 
unprepared for combat and they suffered badly for it. Their training did not provide the 
simulator fidelity required to create the “Pre-Battle Veterans” required to win in the first 
fight. Senior tactical leaders within the Eighth Army identified the barriers to effective 
training in the form of small training areas, ammunition shortages, and an occupation 
mentality. However, these warnings went unheeded and proved detrimental to training 
and combat readiness. As a result, Soldiers with antitank weapons misunderstood their 
capabilities, leaders at the Battalion and Regimental Levels were unfamiliar with 
maneuvering large organic and attached units, and junior leaders were content with the 
status quo believing the days of ground combat were over.225  
From a technology standpoint, the North Koreans maintained an advantage 
compounded by the failure of American risk analysis and mitigation. The U.S. Army 
units were equipped with outdated and ineffective weapons that were no match for the 
advancing North Korean armored columns. The lack of training with aerial fires and the 
failure of U.S. antitank weapons produced a hazard unrealized by American leaders. The 
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lack of mitigating measures, specifically, the inability to use the Air Force antitank 
capabilities, allowed the North Koreans to, literally, roll over and through American 
blocking positions.  
Notably, there was such a significant inadequacy in the leadership of U.S. tactical 
units, that senior commanders could not organize a defense. “Those [units] with good 
officers performed magnificently; those with poor officers performed miserably.”226 
Each leader knew that the enemy was using Soviet equipment, and the most likely 
Mission Essential Task would be to establish a defense. Despite this, the chain of 
command, from General MacArthur on down, prioritized occupation responsibilities and 
enabled a belief that the Army would not go to war. This lack of leadership in the form of 
purpose, motivation, and direction led to the erosion of readiness at all levels. As a result, 
training was neglected in lieu of occupation and the short amount of time in which to 
prepare Soldiers for war prevented the large-scale collective exercises necessary to 
achieve the simulator fidelity required to combat and delay the North Korean advance. 
B. 1st BATTALION, 7th CAVALRY REGIMENT IN THE BATTLE OF IA 
DRANG 
Fifteen years after the destruction of Task Force Smith, U.S. Army Infantry 
tactical units again engaged in conventional high intensity conflict, this time in Vietnam. 
On November 14, 1965, Soldiers of 7th Cavalry Regiment (Air Mobile) inserted into 
Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray in pursuit of a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) enemy force 
estimated to be 200 men.227 In reality, these men inserted at the base of mountain that 
housed three NVA battalions, approximately 1600 enemy soldiers.228 The 1st Battalion, 
7th Cavalry Regiment was commanded by LTC Harold “Hal” Moore, a combat veteran of 
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the Korean War and one the U.S. Army’s leading experts on air mobile infantry.229 He 
and 450 of his Soldiers landed in waves at LZ X-Ray and established a battalion defense. 
One hour and twenty seven minutes after landing, the NVA attacked the LZ in an attempt 
to overrun the American force. However, the supporting UH-1A helicopters (hueys) 
continually resupplied men and ammunition, while various forms of American fire power 
prevented the enemy from achieving their tactical objective.230 During the first day of 
combat, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry sustained 85 casualties.231 
The second day of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry’s battle in the Ia Drang valley was 
worse. At 0650, the weight of the enemy regiments bore down on defending Americans. 
However, the call of “Broken Arrow,” a code word indicating that an American unit was 
in danger of being overrun, summoned every Air Force fighter and bomber in 
Vietnam.232 Local artillery fired more than 8,000 rounds, while air assets flew 350 sorties 
in support of the surrounded infantry battalion.233 The relentless close air support (CAS) 
and constant artillery prevented the North Vietnamese from destroying the American 
Battalion and forced an enemy withdrawal.234 1st Battalion was relieved by 2nd Battalion, 
7th Cavalry at which point LTC Moore led the return to base and was the last man from 
his Battalion to leave the battlefield.235 While U.S. Army history remembers the battle of 
Ia Drang as a great American victory, bear in mind that the North Vietnamese also 
claimed victory.236 Despite the North Vietnamese Army’s failure to destroy 1st Battalion, 
they retained control of the ground, and inflicted 40% casualties on LTC Moore’s 
Battalion, and even more casualties on 2nd Battalion.237 The American Soldiers of 1st 
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Battalion, 7th Cavalry survived an enemy attack, outnumbered eight to one. Why, what 
prevented their destruction? The following section will examine this battle by looking at 
the leadership of LTC Moore, the training the 1st Battalion did prior to insertion in LZ X-
Ray, and the application of weapons technology to better understand how the 1st Battalion 
survived and ultimately claimed victory.  
1. Leadership 
LTC Harold Moore exercised successful command and leadership through his 
character, his intellect, and his ability to both inspire and empower his subordinates.238 
LTC Moore’s example as the first man into LZ X-Ray, and the last to leave, demonstrates 
the leadership character required to motivate Soldiers in combat. As the commander, 
LTC Moore could have remained in a command helicopter coordinating the movements 
of his subordinates from the air, a technique frequently used during the Vietnam War.239 
Instead, he endured the hardships of his Soldiers ensuring both his wounded and his death 
left the battlefield before he did, a testament to the love and respect he had for his 
Soldiers.240  
The Soldiers of LTC Moore’s battalion and the supporting aviators responded to 
his leadership with individual and collective actions that changed the course of the battle. 
Lieutenant General (retired) John Tolson commented that throughout the conflict, the 
supporting aviators “ran a gantlet of enemy fire time after time to help.”241 Furthermore, 
Captain Robert Edwards, the C Co commander, commented that men wounded early in 
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the conflict, remained in their positions and continued fighting.242 In addition to 
individual action, subordinate commanders felt empowered to make decisions, within the 
confines of LTC Moore’s intent. This ability to “rapidly execute tactical maneuvers… 
prevented the enemy from capturing the landing zone.”243  
Throughout the battle, LTC Moore demonstrated an understanding of his 
subordinate units’ locations, and he reinforced and empowered them accordingly. His 
employment of unity of command facilitated increased situational awareness such that he 
was “solely responsible for the actions of all units in the landing zone.”244 He personally 
approved the aerial and indirect fire missions that prevented the destruction of his unit 
and forced the withdrawal of the enemy. In the eyes of his Soldiers, LTC Moore, 
achieved a “victory over…uncertainty” against overwhelming odds, such that the U.S. 
Army validated the airmobile concept and adopted the attrition strategy for combat in the 
Vietnam War.245 LTC Moore successfully led and commanded his men from the 
beginning of the battle to the end. His character and personal example galvanized 
motivation among both his direct subordinates and the attached subordinate units. This 
support enabled his unity of command and increased his situational awareness allowing 
him to provide purpose to his ground forces and direction to the fires assets who then 
executed with devastating effect.  
2. Technology 
LTC Moore’s leadership was enhanced by a technological imbalance between the 
U.S. military and the North Vietnamese Army. Despite the North Vietnamese infantry 
demonstrating a high level of readiness and training, the U.S. Army maintained 
significant mobility advantages due to the helicopter, and lethality advantages due to 
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modern infantry weapons and coordinated fires.246 As early as 1962, the North 
Vietnamese were aware that the UH-1A helicopters provided American forces the ability 
to rapidly insert units, bypass or overfly enemy obstacles and enemy held territory, and to 
continually resupply, rearm, and reinforce their lines while simultaneously evacuating 
their wounded.247 Furthermore, the helicopters provided aerial rocket-artillery and direct 
fires, which proved decisive in this battle. However, for all its advantages, the helicopter 
demanded intense maintenance, required updated intelligence for safety, was extremely 
vulnerable during takeoff and landing, and temporarily limited the size of the assault 
force.248 Despite the known disadvantages and vulnerability. The helicopter when 
properly employed and protected proved critical in the battle of Ia Drang. The mobility 
advantage allowed 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry to surprise the NVA when landing at LZ X-
Ray, and then sustain combat operations despite being outnumbered and surrounded.  
In addition to the mobility and lethality advantage provided by helicopter, the 1st 
Battalion infantrymen used improved personal weapons that also increased their lethality. 
Soldiers were equipped with M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers.249 The M-16 had 
increased accuracy over the North Vietnamese AK-47, and the ballistics of the 5.56mm 
round increased lethality by tumbling through flesh, inflicting more damage than the AK-
47’s larger, steadier 7.62mm slug.250 However, it must be noted that this first model of 
the M16 was prone to jamming, and questions surrounding its reliability provoked a 
Congressional investigation.251 The M-79 grenade launcher increased the range of 
grenades from thirty-five meters (approximately the distance a Soldier can throw) to three 
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hundred and fifty meters.252 The increased range of the grenade allowed squad and team-
sized element to engage dead space well beyond throwing distance.253 The aggressive 
employment of these two weapon systems increased the distance between the defending 
Americans and the assaulting North Vietnamese just enough to concentrate the effects of 
aerial and indirect fires on the enemy while, mostly, mitigating the fratricidal effects of 
friendly fire.  
While the UH-1A “Huey” helicopter and modern Infantry weapon systems were 
critical to success, the decisive technological advantage was in the form of aerial and 
indirect fires. The supporting artillery provided illumination and smokescreens in 
addition to the high-explosive anti-personnel shells.254 The U.S. air force employed 
napalm canisters and various sized bombs that defoliated jungle areas and disrupted 
enemy maneuver.255 The aerial and indirect fires were not delivered haphazardly. LTC 
Moore controlled all weapon systems inside LZ X-Ray and then coordinated fires outside 
the LZ using his Battalion S-3 and Artillery Liaison Officer, who remained in the 
command helicopter through the first day.256 This coordinated integration of ground 
maneuver with indirect and aerial fires “turned the tide of battle in favor of the battalion” 
and ultimately resulted in the survival of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry.257  
The mobility advantage provided by the UH-1A helicopters and the lethality 
advantage provided by modern weapons and overwhelming fires proved enough to 
sustain American forces on LZ X-Ray. Initially outnumbered eight to one, LTC Moore 
employed coordinated direct, indirect, and aerial fires, at extremely close range, with 
devastating effect. Additionally, LTC Moore used the mobility of the helicopter to 
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continually resupply and reinforce his defense while removing his killed and wounded. 
The resulting NVA casualties and their inability to overrun the Americans on LZ X-Ray 
ultimately resulted in North Vietnamese withdrawal.  
3. Training 
The survival and success of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry at the battle of Ia Drang was 
not the product of chance. Instead, the foundation for this phenomenon was laid during 
the two year training cycle preceding it. LTC Moore, as a combat veteran, knew as 
Grossman has observed, that men “do not rise to the occasion in combat, but sink to the 
level of [their] training.”258 After assuming command, LTC Moore charged his Battalion 
with becoming the “best air assault infantry battalion in the world” and devised a 
rigorous, but realistic, training program.259 Incorporating the helicopters into as much 
training as possible, LTC Moore “trained and tested” his men in terrain that most closely 
resembled the expected conditions in Vietnam.260 The following excerpt highlights LTC 
Moore’s training philosophy and the importance he placed on realistic training.  
During those fourteen months before we sailed for Vietnam, we spent 
most of our time in the field, practicing assault landings from helicopters, 
and the incredibly complex coordination of artillery, tactical air support, 
and aerial rocket artillery with the all-important flow of helicopters into an 
out of the battle zone. Commanders had to learn to see terrain differently, 
to add a constant scan for landing zones (LZs) and pick up zones (PZs) to 
all of the other features they had to keep in mind. We practiced rapid 
loading and unloading of men and materiel to reduce the helicopter’s 
window of vulnerability…We would declare a platoon leader dead and let 
his sergeant take over and carry out the mission. Or declare a sergeant 
dead and have one of his PFCs take over running the squad. We were 
training for war, and leaders are killed in battle.261 
LTC Moore highlighted the critical impact of artillery and air support. He 
understood the need to train with the weapon systems and delivery platforms that would 
serve him in combat. Moreover, he appreciated the need to train contingencies. The 
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realistic conditions, cross-training, and contingency training all increased the simulator 
fidelity and combat readiness of LTC Moore’s battalion. 
Regrettably, the training realism LTC Moore desired was hampered by 
regulations and directives intended to increase safety in training. One example was the 
inability to fire danger close missions in training. As a result, “Leaders were reluctant to 
use close-in artillery fire” during combat.262 Following the battle, Captain Edwards 
concluded that “Leaders at all levels must be made aware of the value of close defensive 
artillery” and that the fear of resulting friendly casualties is a misconception that hinders 
combat leaders when employing “the most useful means of influencing enemy action.”263 
LTC Moore continued in his report that “Fire Support to be truly effective must be close-
in.”264 While LTC Moore trained his subordinates on fires integration, the existing safety 
regulations prohibited close-in fire missions. As a result, the reluctance of leaders to 
employ “close-in” fire missions was likely the consequence of a misunderstanding of 
weapons effects and undoubtedly resulted in additional casualties.  
In addition to close-in fires, a second area that was insufficiently trained was 
casualty recovery. Despite, an emphasis on casualty contingency training, the training 
progression neglected casualty recovery. Both LTC Moore and CPT Edwards commented 
that one casualty led to multiple casualties when Soldiers failed to exercise caution when 
attempting to remove the wounded and killed.265 Increased training on casualty recovery 
while under fire may have prevented a significant number of casualties and the high 
attrition rate of combat power on LZ X-Ray.  
Unfortunately, the small gaps in supporting fires and casualty recovery training 
were overshadowed by the significant loss of officers and Soldiers following the 
completion of the training plan. As a consequence of President Lyndon Johnson’s denial 
of the state of emergency in Vietnam, 1st Battalion lost over 50% of their officers - 
Company commanders, platoon leaders, and special staff - just prior to their 
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deployment.266 Moreover, any Soldier that that was nearing the end of his enlistment 
period could not go to Vietnam. This removed “those who had trained longest in the new 
techniques of helicopter warfare” and “would be the most useful in combat.”267 Most of 
the Non-commissioned Officers were veterans of the Korean War and members of 1st 
Battalion for three or more years.268 The loss of trained men and leaders just prior to 
combat undercut the pre-combat veteran status produced and the simulator fidelity 
achieved in training. 
4. Conclusion 
The U.S. Army’s official statement that “nothing in the [North Vietnamese] 
enemy’s background or training had prepared him to cope with the full effects of an 
unleashed airmobile unit” is accurate, but incomplete.269 While it is true that aerial fires 
and mobility provided a monumental advantage, it neglects LTC Moore’s unique 
leadership and the remarkable foresight he showed when executing training for combat. 
The men of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry won the battle at LZ X-Ray because the 
overwhelming technological advantage was amplified by LTC Moore’s ability to 
capitalize on this advantage and incorporate it into his training plan. For fourteen months, 
LTC Moore and his subordinates trained landings and pickups to minimize the 
vulnerability of helicopter. Moreover, the emphasis on fires integration and the use of 
“close-in” fires during the battle prevented the North Vietnamese getting close enough to 
easily engage helicopters landing and taking off from the LZ. LTC Moore knew that if 
the North Vietnamese were able to shoot down a helicopter on the LZ X-Ray, the effect 
would have cut off LTC Moore’s battalion and likely changed the outcome of the 
conflict.270 Despite the emphasis on fires, subordinate leaders demonstrated hesitancy 
when directing close-in fires. This is likely the result of inability to conduct danger close 
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missions in the training environment and the loss of trained leaders shortly before 
deployment. If the same leaders that conducted the fourteen-month training progression 
had also trained danger close fire missions then it is likely that 1st Battalion would have 
endured fewer friendly casualties and caused more enemy casualties. 
C. 75th RANGER REGIMENT DURING THE SEIZURE OF RIO HATO 
AIRFIELD 
Twenty-four years after the Battle of Ia Drang, tactical elements of the U.S. Army 
infantry were again summoned to protect the interests of the United States, this time in 
the Republic of Panama. On December 17, 1989, the 75th Ranger Regiment, one of many 
participating infantry units, was tasked to seize three airfields in the Republic of Panama 
as part of Operation JUST CAUSE.271 Two days later, 837 Airborne Rangers conducted 
a parachute assault of the Rio Hato airfield in the Republic of Panama.272 The 
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) were warned of the assault and provided the stiffest 
resistance of the Panamanian incursion. 400 PDF occupied the airfield, 200 of which 
were members of the “Macho de Montes,” President Manuel Noriega’s elite military 
force.273 Despite this resistance, the Rangers quickly assaulted their objectives, 
dominated their enemy, and seized the airfield in a matter of hours.274 Notwithstanding 
the success of the operation, the mission to seize and clear Rio Hato airfield was not 
without fault. Four Rangers lost their lives; one to a parachute malfunction, two to 
friendly fire, and the fourth to enemy contact. Additionally, 26 other Rangers would be 
wounded during the parachute delivery to the airfield.275 Nevertheless, Operation JUST 
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CAUSE and the seizure of Rio Hato airfield remain an examples of “overwhelming 
success.”276 What was it that made this operation so successful? There were few combat 
veterans within the Ranger Regiment prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, and friendly 
casualty estimates for the seizure of Rio Hato were much higher than the aforementioned 
count.277 An examination of this operation, specifically, the decentralized leadership of 
the tactical commanders, the realistic training conducted prior to the operation, and the 
employment of technological advantages shed light on how an elite infantry unit can 
receive notification of an operation and execute it, almost to perfection, only two days 
later.  
1. Leadership 
Colonel William F. “Buck” Kernan the 75th Ranger Regiment’s commander 
during Operation JUST CAUSE, employed mission command to empower his 
subordinate leaders, resulting in the success of Ranger operations in Panama. COL 
Kernan’s plan for Operation JUST CAUSE was sound, but it required decentralization 
and trust. This trust was not simply given, but earned by the junior leaders. COL Kernan 
demanded back briefs to check his subordinate leaders’ understanding of both the plan 
and his intent.278 Subordinate leaders then made every Ranger “memorize every portion 
of the plan and be able to sketch the objective from memory.”279 The result was that 
“when communications failed, and/or the plan required modification, the junior leaders 
made decisions and made it work.”280 This is mission command.  
COL Kernan knew that he could not maintain enough of his own situational 
awareness to properly control the tactical action at three separate airfields, so he took 
three steps to empower his team and provide them purpose and direction. First, he 
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decentralized the operation into subordinate objectives, assigning responsibility for 
objectives to company commanders with oversight from battalion commanders.281 
Second, he fostered trust and initiative through back briefs, confirming understanding the 
plan and reinforcing direction if required. Third, he provided as much planning and 
rehearsal time as possible to his subordinates. He understood that “planning and 
rehearsals are…more important than trying to create a perfect plan.”282 Further, for 
mission command to work, subordinate leaders require the time and resources to 
communicate their own purpose and direction, but specific to their portion of the mission. 
COL Kernan’s leadership enabled mission command within the 75th Ranger Regiment 
and empowered subordinate leaders with the authority and resources fight and win in 
Panama. 
As a result of COL Kernan’s decentralization of authority and empowerment of 
subordinates, junior leaders were able to demonstrate impressive tactical leadership. 
Firsthand accounts from the seizure of Rio Hato repeatedly emphasize the motivating 
presence and personal example provided by junior officers and noncommissioned 
officers. Prior the jump, Rangers were informed that stealth bombers would not pre-
assault fires on Rio Hato airfield.283 Despite high emotions and an opportunity to curse 
the chain of command, one squad leader, Staff Sergeant Shalala, “broke the ice and fear” 
by holding his weapon in the air yelling, “It doesn’t matter, men, it just doesn’t matter. 
This is all you need!”284 In combat on the airfield, squad leaders and fire team leaders 
immediately assembled teams that “crushed the savage initial resistance” such that the 
“the battle for the airstrip was short, never really in doubt.”285 Additionally, even during 
a friendly fire incident that killed two Rangers and wounded two more, the company 
leaders regained composure, regained the initiative, and continued their clearance of the 
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airfield.286 These junior leaders ultimately won the war.287 Their motivating personal 
example complemented the direction and purpose provided during the operation. The 
execution of mission command, facilitated by COL Kernan’s leadership, provided 
subordinate leaders the opportunity and resources to make decisions and within the 
confines of their commander’s intent. 
2. Training 
The trust between COL Kernan and his subordinates that enabled mission 
command was not automatic or assumed, but was built through rigorous collective and 
individual training. Additionally, the proper assumption of risk during training exercises 
increased realism and provided the requisite simulator fidelity for success in combat. 
Prior to JUST CAUSE, the majority of Mission Essential Task training the Rangers 
conducted centered on airfield seizure exercises.288 Furthermore, the Rangers based 
every training exercise on “real world events and places.”289 They conducted rehearsals 
“until every aspect of the operation became muscle memory at all levels.”290 They 
rehearsed “as many contingencies as possible and conduct[ed] as realistic training as 
possible” adding sandbags to their rucksacks to simulate combat weight and creating full 
mockups of the Rio Hato Airfield.291 They even practiced hotwiring vehicles so they 
could clear an airfield faster.292 Over and over, the Rangers trained their METL tasks 
under conditions that mirrored combat as closely as possible. When the Ranger Regiment 
was recalled two days prior to JUST CAUSE, their task to seize an airfield had been 
practiced and rehearsed, in detail, for years.293 The simulator fidelity achieved in training 
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was such that combat readiness was not a question when the Rangers initiated their 
airborne assault of Rio Hato, it was a given. 
In addition to collective training, individual Rangers were trained to an 
exceptional level. From the moment new Soldiers arrived at the Ranger Regiment they 
were given “extra attention” that encompassed tasks to improve their mental and physical 
toughness. Although new arrivals unanimously despised this attention, all had “a moment 
of clarity. Every bit of extra training … prepare[d] [them] for combat.”294 During the 
seizure of Rio Hato, one Ranger recalled, “If I had to think about it, I couldn’t have done 
any of the tasks required of me that night. However, my body did what it was trained to 
do and went to work.”295 For combat, Soldiers must train as they will fight. At the 
tactical level, well-trained units fight on instinct and muscle memory because they are not 
provided the time to think—Soldiers react.296 The jump at Rio Hato was successful 
because the Rangers were the best trained light infantry and airfield seizure force in the 
world. At the unit level, they practiced full scale airfield seizures and as many 
contingencies as possible, twice per year. Furthermore, they conducted these training 
exercises with supporting members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force so they understood 
what capabilities would accompany them to combat and how to best employ them.297 
Within the confines of doctrine and safety regulation, the Rangers trained and perfected 
their actions under conditions the mirrored combat. 
Unfortunately, differences between the training environment and combat 
environment existed in three specific areas: danger close fire missions, actions of the 
Jumpmasters, and the understanding of weapons effects. The lack of familiarity in all 
three categories proved costly for the ground force as they initiated and conducted the 
assault of the Rio Hato airfield. First, a miscommunication between a forward observer, 
and two AH-6 (little birds) resulted in a friendly fire incident when the aircraft 
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misidentified a Ranger squad as enemy and engaged them.298 The forward observer 
authorized a fire mission within 50m of the friendly forces, neutralizing enemy within a 
compound. This action allowed a suppressed Ranger Squad to initiate an assault of the 
building. Unfortunately, the aircraft did not hear the “end of mission” call and reengaged 
the target mistaking the maneuvering Rangers for enemy.299 At the time of JUST 
CAUSE, controls existed for authorizing danger close fire missions or Close Air Support 
(CAS) missions within a prescribed risk-estimate distance.300 One such control, is the 
personal approval of the ground force commander (GFC), who is expected to weight the 
risk to both the mission and the men when approving the fire mission. In the friendly fire 
case at Rio Hato, it is unknown if the GFC provided authorization. However, it is clear 
that both the approval process to initiate danger close fire missions and their execution 
require additional training, by both the ground force and the aircraft, prior to the 
execution of this mission during combat.  
A second misalignment between the training and combat environments was the 
actions of the Jumpmasters in each aircraft. During training, the Jumpmasters controlled 
the movement of jumpers inside the aircraft, and then jumped last from the aircraft. In 
combat, the Jumpmasters served as the first jumpers in each aircraft and left the safeties 
inside the aircraft to control static lines.301 Given the 26 Rangers injured during the 
combat jump, one might argue that the change in exit procedures led to additional jump 
injuries. The degradation in control of the exit increases the chance for midair collision, 
static line injuries, and parachute malfunctions.302 Again, combat situations seem more 
likely to produce friendly casualties when the training environment does not properly 
simulate the combat environment.  
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The third area where training and combat were misaligned was specific to the 
understanding of weapons effects in an urban area. The after action report following 
Operation JUST CAUSE highlighted the need to conduct realistic demolition breaching 
and to fire organic weapons at multiple materials (concrete, steel, iron) to understand the 
effect each round and type of ordinance has to various materials.303 Further, the report 
stressed the necessity to train Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) under 
realistic conditions.304 While the Rangers did train MOUT, their training lacked realism 
of city lights, high rise buildings, and crowed streets.305 Moreover, the Rangers were one 
of the best U.S. Army units at employing both personal weapons and demolitions. 
However, their training conducted lacked aspects such as realistic breaching surfaces and 
civilian clutter. As a result, the simulator fidelity achieved by training was degraded and 
later manifested as civilian casualties and slow urban clearance operations.306  
Despite these training gaps in danger-close fires, Jumpmaster actions, and 
weapons’ effects in urban areas, the Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment received 
superior training and simulator fidelity at both the individual and collective levels. The 
selection of Mission Essential Tasks and emphasis on training transformed each Ranger 
into a pre-battle veteran. For this reason, the airborne operation to seize Rio Hato “felt 
just like any other training mission.”307 However, those areas where risk was not 
assumed in training—danger close fire missions, jumpmaster duties during the combat 
jump, and weapons effects in urban environments—created areas where the simulator 
fidelity achieved in training broke down and effected the Ranger combat performance. 
The Ranger Regiment’s performance during JUST CAUSE was a product of their 
training. They created pre-battle veterans with realistic and rigorous training exercises, 
but those gaps in training increased the vulnerability of both the mission and their force. 
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3. Technology  
In addition to their superior training, a significant technological advantage 
enabled the Ranger’s quick seizure of the Rio Hato airfield and their domination over the 
Panamanian Defense Force. The Rangers enjoyed advantages in both lethality and 
mobility that mitigated the protection advantage maintained by the defending PDF. The 
Rangers controlled multiple aerial fires platforms: the AC-130 gunship, AH-64 Apache 
helicopters, and AH-6 little birds. These platforms provided “precision fire control and 
accura[cy]” such that the Rangers could freely operate within the confines of their rules 
of engagement (ROE).308 Complementing the lethality of precision munitions, the 
Rangers possessed night vision capability which gave them a significant maneuver 
advantage during the night assault while simultaneously providing addition fire control 
measures with infrared marking.309 This allowed them to move faster on the airfield and 
communicate visually with the supporting aircraft in a manner undetectable by the PDF. 
While increased mobility on the airfield was beneficial, the technology used to deliver the 
Rangers to their airfield proved equally advantageous. Using a combination of C-130 and 
C-5 aircraft, the Rangers placed almost 900 men onto an enemy held airfield in a matter 
of minutes.310 While technology does not decide the victor in war, the combination of 
mass transit aerial delivery technology, night-vision technology, and precision air-to-
ground engagement platforms provided the Rangers a significant lethality and mobility 
advantage that mitigated the risk provided by the enemy protection advantage of the PDF 
defenders. 
4. Conclusion 
Close analysis shows, the Rangers were well-prepared for combat in the Republic 
of Panama. Despite a lack of combat veterans, COL Kernan fostered a culture of mission 
command where subordinate leaders took ownership of the training and created “pre-
battle veterans.” Junior leaders invested themselves in new arrivals, preparing them for 
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the mental and physical rigors of combat and instilling the muscle memory required to 
execute individual drills and small unit battle drills. Company commanders established 
the METL that centered on airfield seizure and the associated contingencies. Senior 
leaders ensured that training events were conducted with any units that might support a 
combat airfield seizure. As a result, the Ranger Regiment was uniquely qualified to work 
with supporting air-to-ground fire support platforms increasing their mobility and 
lethality advantage and decreasing the protection of the PDF holding Rio Hato airfield.  
Despite their superior training and technological advantages, the Rangers 
experienced shortfalls in training that may have resulted in casualties. The training 
restrictions that prevented danger close fire missions and/or fire missions within the 
minimum safe distance created areas of ambiguity on the battlefield. Further, changes to 
jumpmaster actions during the combat jump, may have increased the chance for jump 
injuries. Similarly, the training restrictions that prevented a thorough understanding of 
weapons effects delayed breaching operations when Rangers needed to breach various 
materials that they had not breached in training.311 These gaps in training can be 
rectified, however, a trusting leader and culture of mission command is required to first 
identify these gaps, and then assume the necessary risk in training to address them.  
D. CONCLUSION— LEADERSHIP IS THE LINCHPIN FOR COMBAT 
PREPARATION 
U.S. Army Infantry units train so that when they endure combat for the first time 
they are prepared. However, in each of the three cases, empowered leadership stands out 
as the decisive variable when assessing an Infantry unit’s training and performance in 
combat. If the training conducted in preparation for combat simulates the conditions 
created by the environment, enemy, and higher headquarters, then it is more applicable to 
the combat environment and the unit is more prepared. For this reason, leadership takes 
precedence as the most important variable. Leaders are responsible for compounding the 
technological advantage, implementing realistic training, and synergizing the resulting 
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simulator fidelity with their presence, such that Soldiers enter combat for the first time as 
“Pre Battle Veterans.” 
A review of the leaders from the first and last case study reinforces the impact 
leaders have in both combat and in preparation. The leaders and Soldiers of Task Force 
Smith created a training environment divorced from the combat environment. The result 
was the misunderstanding of weapons effects, an underestimation of the enemy, the 
unnecessary loss of American life, and the failure of their mission to delay the North 
Korean advance. On the contrary, the leaders of the 75th Ranger Regiment during 
Operation JUST CAUSE created a training environment that nearly replicated the combat 
environment in every way. The result was much different; in a matter of hours, Rangers 
dominated each of their objectives while enduring minimal casualties. The fact that 
Rangers prepared extensively at the individual and collective levels gave them an 
understanding of the combat environment such that their actions during Operation JUST 
CAUSE were almost automatic. 
Additionally, an understanding of the weapons technology misalignment is 
essential for establishing conditions that favor success in combat. The 1st Battalion, 7th 
Cavalry utilized the helicopter to bypass enemy held territory, provide aerial fires, 
coordinate unit maneuver, and resupply an isolated defense during the battle of Ia Drang. 
This technology advantage provided by the helicopter and compounded by overwhelming 
fires enabled the defending Americans to survive the attack of a well-trained and 
experienced force that outnumbered them eight to one. By way of contrast, Task Force 
Smith endured a technology disadvantage when they attempted to defend against an 
armored advance without an anti-tank capability. Understanding the misalignment in 
weapons technology creates the potential for both advantage and disadvantage. It is a 
leader’s responsibility to see this, train for it, and employ it effectively in combat. 
While each of the examined cases reveal gaps in Soldiers’ training, it is evident 
that the closer training mirrored combat, the better the units performed in combat. 
Training for combat must provide the simulator fidelity only achieved through realism 
that mimics the conditions expected in combat. The examination of Task Force Smith 
during the Korean War, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry during the Vietnam War, and the 75th 
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Ranger Regiment during Operation JUST CAUSE suggest that when training resembles 
combat, technology misalignments are understood, and leaders synergize their 
advantages and mitigate their disadvantages. As a consequence, the conditions for 
success in combat may be established before the battle takes place.  
On the contrary, the examination of the disparity between training and combat 
revealed that a lack of preparation increases the likelihood of friendly casualties. This 
was most evident with Task Force Smith where the training was divorced from the 
conditions of combat. However, even with 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 75th Ranger 
Regiment these gaps, where safety regulation either limited or prevented simulator 
fidelity, were exacerbated in combat. The battles of Ia Drang and Rio Hato airfield 
underscore a need to train danger close fire missions. In the Ia Drang valley, “close-in 
fires” were decisive in preventing the battalion from being overrun by a numerically 
superior enemy. However, the lack of danger close fire missions in training created 
hesitancy among junior leaders which allowed the enemy to get “inside the fires” at 
which point the Americans were forced to fight at near range, sometime hand-to-hand. 
The same is true of the Rangers during JUST CAUSE. The lack of danger-close fires 
training created ambiguity in combat when leaders were trying to conduct these missions 
for the first time. Unfortunately, in both these engagements, danger close mission 
resulted in fratricide that might have been prevented with focused training. 
Realistic training is a commander’s responsibility, therefore, effective leadership 
is the linchpin to proper combat preparation. When leaders are empowered to analyze the 
enemy, evaluate the technology available, and create a training plan, the result is much 
more powerful. The leaders of post-WWII Far East Command were anything but 
empowered. They inherited a culture that prioritized occupation over training, and 
believed the days of ground combat were over because of American nuclear deterrence. 
As a result, they were ignorant of the risks assumed when deprioritizing realistic training, 
unaware of their technological disadvantage, and unprepared for their future enemy. 
Fortunately, the lessons from Task Force Smith’s destruction, were learned by LTC 
Harold Moore and applied to a training plan that capitalized on his technological 
advantages, while mitigating his vulnerabilities. However, it is important to note that this 
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training plan was undercut by the instability of the personnel management system and 
existing policies of the time. Despite a training plan that created the necessary pre-combat 
veterans required for combat success, the receivers of that training plan were removed 
shortly before combat. As a result, the simulator fidelity provided by the training, 
degraded with the loss of pre-combat veteran officers, NCOs, and Soldiers. Fortuitously, 
the leaders of the 75th Ranger Regiment seemed to achieve what LTC Moore could not, 
an intense and realistic training density that created pre-battle veterans who endured 
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V. CONCLUSION— THE OUTSOURCING OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY UNDERMINES MISSION 
COMMAND 
This study began with the proposition that risk mitigation and risk aversion 
affected tactical Infantry units’ combat preparation. However, the examination of how 
Infantry companies train, how risk is managed, how risk is perceived, and how training 
affects combat performance, revealed that the U.S. Army’s risk mitigation doctrine is 
both sound and effective. The problem regarding combat preparation is that this doctrine 
is not implemented in concert with the U.S. Army’s philosophy of mission command. In 
combat, Infantry company commanders are delegated the authority to conduct risk 
mitigation. In training, this risk management authority is outsourced to an agency outside 
the chain of command: Range Control. While commanders in training remain responsible 
for everything their units do and fail to do, they are not provided the risk management 
authority required to shoulder this responsibility. As long as the bureaucracy created by a 
“safety first” culture remains, mission command will remain a philosophy employed only 
when convenient and quickly undermined by the increasing “zero-defect” standard.  
The difference between risk management authorities in training and operational 
environments results in the erosion of simulator fidelity and inhibits the transition of 
Mission Essential Task execution from one environment to the next. The concept of 
simulator fidelity suggests that realism in all aspects of training results in combat 
readiness or what Dave Grossman calls “Pre-Battle Veterans.”312 These are Soldiers that 
understand their enemy, comprehend the effect of their weapon systems, and will fight 
like seasoned veterans despite never having seen the horrors of combat before. This is the 
goal of every commander preparing his Soldiers for war. Unfortunately, U.S. Army 
Safety regulations undermine the authority of commanders to assess and mitigate risk and 
abdicate that authority to Range Control. This abdication neglects three significant points 
that undermine the concept of mission command. First, Range Control does not take into 
account the commander’s assessment of training, nor does it factor in the enemy, mission, 
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and technological balance that commanders must understand to win their first 
engagement. Second, the demand for “safety first” erodes realism during combat 
validation exercises. Third, the centralization of risk management allows the cognitive 
and perceptual biases that inflate risk to infect the training environment, increasing the 
disparity between training and combat, and eroding the necessary simulator fidelity to 
win the first battle. The requirement to create “pre-battle veterans” and to “train as [we] 
fight” demands that junior leaders receive the authority they need to effectively manage 
risk and prepare their infantrymen to win the next first battle.313 Unfortunately, the 
centralization of safety doctrine and risk assumption authority prevents Infantry units 
from achieving the simulator fidelity gained through scenario-specific and realistic 
training.  
The failure to integrate a unit’s training proficiency, technological advancements, 
and the conditions expected of the combat environment erodes the simulator fidelity 
produced in training. Range Control, as a centrally managed agency, treats all training 
units the same and holds them to the same standards. Infantry companies require different 
training that prepares them to “close with the enemy by means of maneuver to destroy or 
capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.”314 During 
LFXs, this mission requires SDZs that facilitate maneuver and close combat. Training 
realistically means incorporating danger-close fire missions, as both the Battle of Ia 
Drang and the Seizure of Rio Hato emphasized. Moreover, these SDZs must account for 
changes in technology. Advancing optics and weapons’ technology increase accuracy and 
limit dispersion. Similarly, night-vision devices and infrared lasers provide increased 
situational awareness and additional control measures during hours of limited visibility. 
However, none of the aforementioned resulted in smaller SDZs or flexible safety 
doctrine. Instead, SDZs and training restrictions have only grown, preventing an 
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understanding of weapons capabilities and effects.315 A failure to understand weapons 
capabilities and validate them in training led to the destruction of Task Force Smith, a 
reminder of the permanent cost failing to prepare for combat incurs. Centralizing risk 
assumption authority, under the guise of range safety doctrine, undermines the efforts of 
leaders trying to make training realistic enough to prepare infantryman for high-intensity 
conflict. 
The increased emphasis on safety and the elevation of Range Control to an 
approving authority for training ignores the U.S. Army’s leadership philosophy and 
reinforces a “zero-defect” training environment. Live Fire Exercises (LFXs) often serve 
as validation for platoons and companies; however, these events devolve into scripted 
scenarios where there is a right way and wrong way to execute the lane. A more senior 
leader overshadows the ground force commander, usually a junior office, and an 
Observer/Controller (OC) guides every maneuver element and crew served weapon 
system and often dictates where to emplace, when to shoot, and what to shoot at. More 
concerning, is that these scripted scenarios reinforce the “zero-defect” training 
environment, where leaders and OCs tell Soldiers in training exactly how to accomplish a 
task, rather than assuming the risk to let Soldiers make mistakes and learn from them. 
This artificial control creates “training scar tissue” and erodes the confidence and trust 
Soldiers have in their leadership.316 For mission command to work, leaders must 
empower their subordinates to calculate risk, assume risk, and act in support of the higher 
mission.  
The calculation of risk and its assumption is most effective when delegated to the 
appropriate command level. Maintaining safety as an inflexible trump card leads to the 
misalignment of the perception of risk and its genuineness. Declaring a hazard or activity 
unsafe, such as danger-close fire missions or maneuver within SDZs, allows 
advancements that increase safety to go unnoticed. The impression of danger persists 
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because the amount of information to invalidate the initial declaration is considerably 
greater than the amount of information required to make the declaration in the first place. 
This bias manipulates the perception of risk associated with a given hazard. Furthermore, 
the loss aversion that permeates existing doctrine and the paradox of risk mitigation 
exacerbates this misperception. Current doctrine frames severity in terms of loss and 
neglects the natural tendency to feel more concerned about risk and more vulnerable to it 
as the level of safety increases. These tendencies combine to misalign the perception of 
risk and its reality. Further, the abdication of risk mitigation authority to an element 
outside the chain of command undermines junior leaders’ ability to properly assess and 
mitigate genuine risk associated with the hazards of realistic training. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO CURRENT PRACTICES 
AND U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE 
1. U.S. Army Safety Doctrine Must Clarify the Role of Range Control 
The safety of U.S. Army Soldiers while conducting unit training is that unit 
commander’s responsibility. On every U.S. Army training installation, Range Control is 
the sole authority over Soldiers’ actions while they are conducting training within the 
confines of their installation. This report strongly recommends empowering junior 
leaders and holding them responsible for the training and safety of their Soldiers. Range 
Control should remain the primary source of training area deconfliction and retain the 
authority to ensure weapons effects remain within the confines of the allocated training 
space and avoid affecting another unit or area. Additionally, Range Control should 
remain the liaison between the installation and local emergency services. However, 
Range Control should not be the authority for determining shift fire lines, enforcing 
Minimum Safe Distances, or directing training scenarios. These are tasks that U.S. Army 
Infantry units execute overseas as part of the risk management process. Abdicating tasks 
that units are responsible for in the operational environment undermines the training of 
leaders and hinders combat preparation. While Range Control officers are essential to 
scheduling, maintaining, and modernizing range facilities, the U.S. Army should address 
their current usurpation of command authority in the risk management process. 
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2. U.S. Army Installations and Training Commands Should Streamline the 
Safety Waiver Process 
The current safety waiver process is so extensive and time consuming that 
commanders cannot adhere to it within the limits of the unit training management 
timeline. The result is the avoidance of the process, which places junior leaders in a 
compromising position. Either they accept that the training will lack the necessary 
realism to provide simulator fidelity or they knowingly violate outdated Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) with the intention of improving the quality of training. Dr. 
Leonard Wong detailed reasons for “dishonesty in the army profession,” and he is correct 
that the bureaucracy of the U.S. Army’s systems and the “deluge of requirements” forced 
on U.S. Army leaders place them in integrity-compromising positions.317 It is unlikely 
that leaders plan training events with the intention of violating SOPs, rather, they lack the 
command authority to assume risk. Moreover, the protracted process to even request a 
waiver is impractical given the timeline provide to plan, resource, and execute training. 
U.S. Army installation commanders should streamline the safety waiver system and 
provide a viable alternative to compromising one’s integrity in an effort to improve 
training.  
3. Educate Leaders on the Effects of Cognitive and Perceptual Bias When 
Managing Risk 
The perception of risk becomes misaligned with the reality of risk when it is 
communicated in terms of loss and/or affected by cognitive and perceptual biases. 
Current risk management doctrine categorizes severity in terms of loss. This frame of 
reference manipulates the perception of risk almost twice as much as a frame of reference 
that communicates empirical data in terms of gain.318 Additionally, the paradox of risk 
mitigation and biases also cement frames of reference that further influence the 
perception of risk. The result is senior decision makers who are unaware that their 
perception of risk is misaligned with its reality. Consequently, these decision makers feel 
the need to centralize control over risk mitigation and undermine the authority their 
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subordinate leaders require to conduct the risk management process as intended. 
Educating leaders would allow them to recognize these phenomena and avoid the 
resulting misperceptions.  
4. Senior Leaders Must Commit to Mission Command in the Training 
Environment 
Currently, a bureaucracy defined by risk aversion and administrative requirements 
blankets the training environment. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis is correct 
when he stated that requirements that do not advance the “art and science of warfighting” 
must go.319 However, the U.S. Army must go one step further. Eliminating unnecessary 
training requirements will provide more time for training, but it would not address the 
lack of authorities junior leaders require. The philosophy of mission command demands 
the empowerment of the appropriate command level. Empowering junior leaders in the 
training environment with the authorities of the combat environment would facilitate the 
vertical and horizontal trust among teams that maintain from one environment to the next. 
Moreover, empowering junior leaders would allow for innovative new practices. The 
current centralized system of training discourages innovation, undermines realism, and 
promotes a “zero-defect” Army. Junior leaders should be encouraged to try new methods 
and fail so long as they learn. The U.S. Army’s Infantry leaders will be more prepared 
and more lethal in combat if they learn to think and fight through problems in training. 
B. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL 
EXAMINATION 
(1) How can tactical leaders avoid the effects of political and/or strategic risk 
aversion?  
The effects of U.S. policy and the implementation of strategic decisions affect 
tactical leaders’ ability to manage risk. The degradation of readiness demonstrated by Far 
East Command after World War II resulted in Infantry units unprepared for combat. 
Politicians misinterpreted their own policy, and senior military leaders failed to anticipate 
the commitment of ground troops to Korea. As a consequence, leaders at the tactical level 
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of war inherited units there were physically and psychologically unprepared for war. The 
effect of policy was also felt prior to combat in Vietnam. Then-LTC Harold Moore 
details losing nearly 50% of officers and noncommissioned officers just prior to 
deployment because of President Lyndon Johnson’s unwillingness to push for a 
Congressional declaration of war in Vietnam.320 As a result of U.S. policy, a tactical unit 
endured a significant loss in simulator fidelity shortly before the Battle of Ia Drang, one 
of the most intense combat engagements of the Vietnam War. While commanders remain 
responsible for all their units do and fail to do, further study on maintaining combat 
readiness at the tactical level of war, despite current policy or strategy, would allow 
commanders the ability keep Soldiers prepared for war and not risk another Task Force 
Smith. 
(2) How does the misalignment of mission command between the training 
environment and the combat environment affect trust within tactical units? 
Trust is a principle of mission command and is achieved through realistic training. 
Recent articles and books posit that Soldiers in combat “fight for the [Soldiers] on [their] 
left and [their] right.” This implies that the element of trust is a key motivator for Soldiers 
in combat. Research that compares levels of trust between Soldiers in multiple 
environments may reveals how leaders can increase Soldier motivation in training, or 
align Soldiers’ personal goals with those of the organization. 
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